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ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF
RWANDA'S GENOCIDE
Jason Strain and Elizabeth Keyes"

A. INTRODUCTION

Over the span of 100 days in 1994, almost one million Rwandans
died in a genocide that left Rwandan society traumatized and its institutions in disarray. The genocide implicated not only the actual instigators and killers, who came hom allleveJs of Rwandan society, but also
the culture of impunity that had thrived in Rwanda for decades. This
culture of impunity and inaction in the face of atrocities eerily mirrored
the international community's failure to intervene to prevent or respond
to the genocide. The genocide provoked a process of reflection within
Rwanda and the broader international community about how the genocide came to pass and how Rwanda can rebuild so that such an event
will never happen again. This chapter attempts one element of this reflection by considering how the legal mechanisms established in the aftermath of the genocide might help transform the Rwandan culture of
impunity into a culture of accountability.
Although the world in 1994 thought about the genocide as an ethnic or "tribal" problem, ethnicity masked deeper problems in Rwandan
society. Since colonial times, Rwandans experienced variations on the
politics of exclusion, practiced alternately by the Tutsi under colonial
rule and the Hutu after independence.' Power became an all-orJason and Elizabeth would like to thank Professor Jane Stromseth for
her invaluable insights, guidance and encouragement throughout the process
of writing this chapter. Jason thanks Amanda Strain for her support and encouragement. Elizabeth would like to thank her husband Nicholas for his unfailing
supportl and Gloriosa Uwimpuhwe and Paul MiHer for generously sharing their
insights on the gacaca process.
1. See generally, PHILIP GOL,REVITCH, ""'lE WJSH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW

WE WiLL BE KILLED WITH OUR FA'-1ILlES (1998); MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEt-;
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nothing proposition, and fear of losing power justified any actions, no
matter how violent. A cycle of exclusion, fear and repression thus developed, As the Rwandan Ambassador to the United Nations remarked in
late 1994, "the perpetrators of [earlier massacres] were never brought to
justice for their acts. The recent genocide in Rwanda, , , is the direct
result of this culture of impunity.'" The legal response to genocide must
therefore do more than hold perpetrators responsible for their actions;
it must also provide a new model of accountability and reconciliation
that will serve in the broader societal project of dismantling the culture
of impunity.
The legal response to the genocide needs to achieve multiple, often
competing goals: justice, reconciliation and deterrence, all in the service of breaking the cycle of fear and repression that has too long characterized Rwandan politics, The model developing in Rwanda exists at
three levels: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is
the international community's effort to hold some of the most serious
perpetrators accountable for their crimes; the Rwandan national judicial system has shared jurisdiction with the ICTR for the most serious
crimes, and also handles the many thousands of lower level crimes; and
the recently inaugurated gacaca courts use a traditional community-based
legal approach to try all but the most serious of crimes. Each of these
systems has particular reasons for existence and particular areas of expertise; each has arso encountered serious criticism. ranging from lack of
efficiency for the lCTR and the national system, to concerns about due
process in gacaca. This chapter examines how the three mechanisms,
taken as a whole, may rise above the weaknesses of each component
part to offer a coherent legal response to genocide, and how the different mechanisms can work together in a con1plementary manner to
achie"e the multiple goals at stake as Rwanda rebuilds.
Rwanda's creation of a suitably complex and sophisticated legal
response to the genocide is one reason for cautious hope today. This
chapter argues that despite the tensions inherent in this tripartite judicial framework, these types of innovative actions can promote account-

Vlcn:-'fS BECOME KtLLERS (2001); GERARD PRLNIER, THr RV\':\:-JDA CR[SIS1959-1994:
HlSTORY Of A GE"DClDE (1995),
2. The Situation Concerning Rwanda: Establishment of an InternatJonal
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
InteroiltionaJ Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and

Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Such Violations Committed in the Territory
of C\:eighboring States, U,N, SCOR, 49th Sess" 3453rd mtg" U,N, Doc. S/PY,3453
(1994) [hereinafter IeTR ESTABU5HME'JTj (statemenl of Manzi Bakuramutsa of
Rwanda); see also MAMDAr-:t, supra note t 185-233.
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ability for crimes against humanity. The framework provides the
Rwandan people, their leaders, and the international community with
the opportunity to shape a new political culture where genocide and
violence are no longer viewed as acceptable responses to societal frustrations. The legal structure cannot ensure the political will to create this
new culture, but it remains the si1!c qua non for these efforts and therefore deserves support from all levels.
Section B of this chapter discusses the sources of the genocide in
Rwandan history and provides the background for the national and
international legal response. Section C examines the role of the ICTR
and its effectiveness as a legal response by the international community.
Section 0 turns to the Rwandan national judicial system, discussing its
prospects for achieving both accountability and reconciliation. Section
E examines the hopes and concerns relating to the SGcaca process, the
most innovative part of the tripartite legal response. Section F assesses
the interrelationships among these three approaches to accountability
for the Rwandan experience and sets forth lessons for the future, particularly for the I"'wIy created International Criminal Court.
B.

BACKGROUND

1.

Roots of Conflict

On April 6, 1994, a missile shot down the plane carrying President
Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Ntaryamira of Burundi, providing the immediate spark for the genocide in Rwanda. The sources of
the conflagration, however, reach much farther back into Rwanda's history. The three ethnic groups that comprise the Rwandan populationHutu (roughly 84 percent of the population of 8 million), Tutsi (roughly
15 percent) and Twa (roughly 1 percentj-coexisted in a densely populated area of land smaller than the state of Maryland. These groups spoke
the same Kinyarwanda language, worshipped in the same way, and often
interrnarried. 1

Despite the groups' unifying characteristics, salient differences existed
even before colonization. Each group once held a different function in
Rwandan society: the Twa were hunter-gatherers, the Hutu were cultivators, and the Tutsi were pastoralists. In a society that measured wealth
in terms oi cattle, the Tutsi once stood as the preeminent sodal group.
Moreover, notwithstanding the intermarriages and iluid boundaries
among the groups, Tutsis also tended to have Nilotic features, in contrast
3.

See generally P!-(UNIEJ{r supra note 1; GOCREVITCH, supra note 1.

.4ccOImtability for Atrocities

90

to the Bantu features of the Hutu,· European explorers of the late 19th
century, preoccupied with "race science," seized upon the Tutsi features
as evidence of innate Tutsi superiority over the Hutu; indeed, these early
ethnographers cast the Tutsi pedigree back to the Bible and popularized
the myth that Tutsis were descendants of Ham,; Although the Hamitic
myth elevated the Tutsi in European eyes, it gave them an ultimately
undesirable outsider status within Rwanda, which became a powerful
tool in the 19905 for proponents of Hutu Power.
During the colonial period, first the Germans (1897-1916) and later
the Belgians (1916-1959) ignored commonalities among the groups and
instead built their colonial systems around their beliefs that the minority Tutsi were the superior group in Rwanda, This system depended
upon the rigid classification and separation of ethnic groups, and 50
each Rwandan was issued an identity card establishing whether he or
she was Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.· Anyone with one Hutu parent and one
Tutsi parent had to choose one ethnicity. The rigid colonial structure
simply would not accommodate the real fluidity among the groups.'
Once the colonizers classified the population, they systematically
excluded all but a few Hutu and Twa from the privilege, bestowed
upon Tutsis, specifically education and employment within the colonial government.s
In the 19505, the forces that underlay the colonial structure began to
shift. Hutu intellectuals began to argue against the unfairness of the
existing system, A new wave of colonial administrators, whose working class origins in Flemish Belgium led them to sympathize more with
the Hutu masses than the Tutsi elite, encouraged these arguments. In
1959, the first episode of political violence between Hutu and Tutsi
erupted, from which the Hutu emerged as the dominant political force,
In the midst of the violence, Belgium began organizing the transition to
Rwandan self-government. Independence came in 1962, and with it a
short· lived regime that shared power between Hutu and Tutsi parties.
Events in 1963, however, altered the way that the two groups would
interact for years to come, Tutsis in exile in Burundi launched the 50called inyenzi9 raids against the new Hutu government; the raids were
4. Generally, Nilotic ethnldties tend to be taller and have lighter compleXIons and more angular fadal features, while many Bantu ethnidties tend to
be shorter and "stockier," with less sharp facial features, See MAMDAl\'r, sup/'{}
note 1, at 44.
5. See GOUREVITCH, supra note l~ at 55,
6.
7,

Jd, at .56-57,
Jd.

8,

Sef' PRUNIER, supra note j f at 33.

9.

Inyenzi means cockroach in Kinyarwanda; the term was used frotn the
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quickly suppressed, but their real costs were prolound-Hutus killed
10,000 Tuts;s in retribution, and the Hutu government dosed the door
on Tutsi political participation,IO The raids provided a vital tool to those
in lavor of exclusion, who manipulated Hutu fears of future Tutsi invasions into support lor completely excluding Tutsis,1J Tutsis would be
denied any meaningful political voice for another three decades,

2. Events leading Up to 1994
By the late 19805, a split arose within Juvenal Habyarimana's Hutu
government. Moderates within his party held an indusive vision of
Rwandan society and engaged in reforms to reopen Rwandan politics
to Tutsi participation; this group's influence led the Rwandan government to adopt the 1993 Aru5ha Accords establishing a transition to true
power-sharing, The party's extremist wing, which saw exclusion and
extermination of Tutsis as the only way to secure peace in Rwanda,
increasingly criticized the moderate vision, This political force gave rise
to the genOcidal "Hutu Power" movement in the 19905." Although the
extremist wing originally lacked a broad base of popular support, its
proponents were at the center of power and induded Habyarimana's
wife and her politically powerful extended family, As moderates moved
closer and closer to power-sharing, the extremists became ever more virulent in their crusade against Tuts;s, employing all available media
resources in their efforts to create anti-Tutsi sentiment across Rwanda.
This extremism gained in popularity as Tutsis made their first serious efforts since the early 19605 to regain their place in Rwanda, The
more than 300,000 Tutsis who fled Rwanda in the 1959-1963 period had
settled as semi-permanent refugees in neighboring Congo,l1LJganda,
Burundi, and Tanzania, l ' This original refugee population doubled as
the Hutu government in Rwanda scapegoated Tutsis, provoking periodic massacres which encouraged more Tutsis to flee, l' Particularly in
19605 through the early 19905 when Hutu Power radio stations broadcast their
message of destruction using "inyenziO as a code word for TutsL Scc id.
10. See PRUNIER, supra note 1 at 56-57.
11. MA\1DANI; supra note 1 at 130-13L
12. P[WN!ER, supra note 1, at 18R
13. Congo became Zaire in 1971, and \-vas renamed the Democratic Republic
1

of Congo in 1997. See, e.g., Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo, BBC NEWs.,

available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ africa/1072684.shn.
14. Estimates of the refugee population vary, but range from 330,000 in the
camps to 500,000, including "self-settled" refugees. See PRU!\J[ER, supra note L at 67,
15. J. Matthew Vaccaro, Politics ofGenodde: Peacekeeping and Dis(15ter Relief
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Uganda, many of these exiled Tutsis received schooling and were welcomed into the army and government service l ' These refugees formed
the nucleus of what became the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a military and political entity detennined to return to Rwanda which, in 1990,
launched an invasion into northwestern Rwanda calling for an end to
exclusion. 17
The RPF invasion and subsequent civil war increased the appeal of
the extremist Hutu Power message, ensuring the extremists' victory in
the power struggle within Habyarimana's government. As Mahmood
Mamdani, a noted scholar of post-colonial identity in Africa, writes, "for
the first time since the inyenz; raids of the early 196Os, the ]990 invasion
raised the specter of Tutsi Power inside Rwanda ... the fact was that
many inside the country agreed that RPF rule would mean nothing but
the return of Tutsi domination:'l. The interplay of history and fear served
the most radical goals of the extremists, who set about organizing the
events that the world watched unfold in April 1994.
3. The Genocide of 1994
The genocide sparked by Habyarimana's assassination on the night
of April 6 began qUickly. Within 45 minutes of the plane crash, militias
set up roadblocks in the capital to stop and kill Tutsis who were passing through the city or trying to escape. By daybreak the Presidential
Guard had brutally murdered Prime Minister Agathe Cwilingiyimana H
Uwilingiyimana was a leading proponent of the Arusha power-sharing
arrangement and with her death the "agenda of reconciliation ceased
to exist."'" Lists that Hutu Power proponents had compiled in painstaking detail for this purpose months earlier were used to quickly find and
kill Tutsis and moderate Hutus throughout Kigali. The interim government used the infamous Radio Tilt!vision Libre des A1mes Collines to full
effect, bombarding the airwaves with incitement to violence and genoin R.1Dlmda f in UN PEACEKEEPINC, AMER[CA:\." POLICY AXD THE Ur-.;C1VfL WA;:{S OF THE
199OS, 367. 370 (William J. Durch ed .• 1996).
.
16, PRVNfER, supra note 1, at 67. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was
ol1ce considered a dangerous outsider, and Vlas even accused by his predeces-

sor Milton Obote of being a Rwandan himself. Museveni \-vas therefore sympa~
thebe to the fhvandan exiles, and his rise to power in 1986 "vas a boon to the
Rwandan exile community in t:ganda. See id.
17. MA\lJ)A"l, supra nott' L at 189.
18. rd.

19. Vaccaro, supra note 15, at 37:l
20. Set: r..-1AMUANi, supra note 1, at 216.

Accountability in the Aftermatll of Rwanda's Genocide

93

cide every hour of the day. Within two weeks, an estimated 250,000 Tutsis
had been killed across the country2! The killings were done at roadblocks and in churches, at the behest of Hutu mayors and by neighbors
in rural villages. Resistance was not tolerated; one prefect who disobeyed
orders and kept his district calm in the first weeks of the genocide was
murdered by the interim government's hand-picked replacement in late
April in front of the citizens of the town. 22
The role played by the churches exemplifies the complete social and
institutional decay that prevailed during the genocide. Many Tutsis initially sought sanctuary in the churches, believing that the genocidaires
would not enter houses of worship. However, despite some remarkable
instances of courage and resistance, the sanctuaries became scenes of
some of the grisliest killings of the genocide when priests and ministers
abandoned those gathered to the killing mobs outside. The chilling title
of Philip Gourevitch's book We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will
Be Killed With Our Families tells of a group gathered at an Adventist church,
who learned that they were scheduled to be killed the next day. They
wrote their Hutu pastor seeking his intercession on their behalf, believing that he could help them if he would. The pastor responded, "You
must be eliminated. God no longer wants yoU." 23 The close association
between the Hutu government and the Catholic Church in particular led
to several notorious instances of church complicity with the genocide.
Even where the churches were not complicit, they were often ineffective
at calling for an end to the violence.2'~ In either case, when the genocide
was finished, the churches had lost most if not all of their moral authority, and were ill-positioned to promote peace or reconciliation.
By the time the RPF secured its military victory in the civil war and
put an end to the genocide in August 1994, an estimated 800,000 people
had been killed, the vast majority of them Tutsi." The RPF had succeeded

21.

ALLISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NO:"JE TO TELL THE STORY. GENOCIDE IN R\VAKDA

(Human Rights Watch, 1994).
22. See MA1-1DA:"JI, supra note 1, at 218.
23. GOL1REVITCH, supra note 1, at 28.
24. PRCKIER, supra note 1, at 250.
25. Finding an exact number has proved exceedingly difficult. See letter
from Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, to President of the

United Nations Security Council, Dec. 9, 1994, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., P 20, U.N.
Doc. 5/1994/1405 (1994) [hereinafter AN"lAN LETTER] (estimating 500,000 dead);
Hirondelle Foundation, q[ficial Census Puts Genocide Toll at Over One Million,
available al http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/(Feb.11. 2002) (last visited May 22, 2002) (citing new Rwandan Census Figures that place the death
toll at over 1 million). Recent estimates almost unanimously place the figure at
close to 1 million.
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in regaining power, but it inherited a country whose institutions had
been frayed if not destroyed, and whose population was deeply traumatized by the genocide. Meanwhile, approximately 1.2 million Hutu
refugees fled across the border into Zaire, into refugee camps run by
international aid organizations at a cost of roughly $1 million a day.
Although many of the refugees were simply swept up in the chaos and
had not participated in the genocide, the genocidaires quickly asserted
control over the camps, benefiting from the international aid while posing a terrifying security risk to those attempting to resume their lives
just across the border in Rwanda.
The genocide left no aspect of Rwandan life unharmed. The Rwandan
economy, long in decline, was in shreds by August 1994. 26 Land, infrastructure and financial structures were all destroyed. The legal system
fared no better; the judiciary existed more in theory than in practice, with
fewer than 400 surviving judges, prosecutors and investigators. Some of
those lawyers who survived were charged with taking part in the genocide." Most important, the new government had to face the reality of
governing a nation comprised of an extraordinary number of highly traumatized individuals. Genocide survivors included legions of children
rendered orphans by the violence, children born of rape, families displaced from their homes, and witnesses to unspeakable atrocities.
Rwandans had to begin the task of figuring out how perpetrators and
victims could live side-by-side while the smell of death hung in the air.

4.

International Role and Response

Among the international community, only the neighboring countries and France and Belgium took a real interest in Rwanda's political
developments. 28 Eventually, as part of the Arusha Accords, the United
Nations agreed to place a peacekeeping force, the UN. Assistance Mission
for Rwanda (UNAMIR), in Rwanda in late 1993. UNAMIR was limited
by its mandate (no Chapter VII ability to enforce peace), by its size and
location (2,500 personnel in Kigali alone) and most of all by the frayed
nerves of the international community following the deaths of 18
26. See PRUNIER, supra note 1, at 306
27. See c.g., Hirondelle News Agency, Survivors Accuse 14 Defencr

Investigators of Genocide Crimes (Mar. 25, 2002), available at http://\,.,lww.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf I.
28. Belgium became involved because it had many Belgian nationals living in Rwanda, and France took an interest for less clear reasons, possibly rebting to what Prunier has called its "Fa shod a syndrome," or fear of Anglophone
supremacy in Africa. PRCKIER, supra note 1, at 105.
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American peacekeepers in Somalia in October 1993 2 ' Although the
prospects for severe violence, if not genocide, were well known to General
Dallaire of Canada, the commander of UNAMIR forces, he was unable
to convince the U.N. to increase UNAMIR's size or change its mandate.")
Indeed, as the genocide broke oot and ten Belgian peacekeepers were
killed, the U.N. Security Council voted to scale down its operations in
Rwanda, leaving Dallaire with only 620 troops." By August 1994, only
the French had actually mobilized troops to intervene; unfortunately,
the French intervention, known as Operation Turquoise~ seemed suspiciously pro-Hutu at the time, and has been even more widely discredited since 1994.32
The United States was notoriously slow to use the word "genocide"
to describe what was unfolding io Rwanda. Although debate rages about
who knew what and when, observers widely assumed at the time that
the slowness was motivated by fear of the legal repercussions triggered
by using the word genocide-repercussions that would have demanded
action." Then-President Bill Clinton told genocide survivors at Kigali
airport in 1998 that the international community "did not do as much
as we could have and should have done to try to limit what occurred in
Rwanda. , .. The international community, together with the nations in
Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy."" This
admission seems inadequate, however, in light of the active efforts the
u.s. Administration led to prevent deployment of peacekeepers and to
keep the U,I\:. from using the word "genocide.""
This coIleelive inaction in the face of one of the 20th century's worst
genocides has left a complicated legacy of guilt in the international community, from the United Nations to the aid organizations who, with very
few exceptions, did not help the victims of the genocide but did help
29. PRcNlER, supra note I, at 274-75.
30, See Samt1ntha Power, Bystanders to Genocide: Why the Unffed States Let
the Rwandan Tragedy Happen, ATL I\,fO!\''THlY (Sept. 2001)~ available of http://www.
thea tlantic.com / issues / 2001 /09/ power.hlm,
31. Vaccaro, supra note 15, at 383,
32. See e,g" Jean !Ytarie Kamatali, Freedom of Expression and Its Limitations:
The Case of the Rwandan Genocide 38 5TA'l. j. I"'T'L L 57, 70 (2(J02) (noting that
France, in Operation Turquoise, "'protected the forces that committed genocide
and facilitated their flight to Congo"),
33. See e,g., Douglas Jehl, Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings
'Genocide: N,Y, T1MES, June 10, 1994, at A8 (noting that the Clinton Administration

feared both legal repercussions and moral imperatives to intervene).
34, James Bennet, Clinton Declares U.s., With ~Vorld, Failed Rwandans, N.Y.
TtMES, Mar. 26, 1998, at 1A.
35, See Power, suprll note 30.
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Hutu refugees, including both perpetrators and other Hutus swept up
in the chaos. UN. Secretary-General Koli Annan, Under· Secretary lor
peacekeeping at the time of the genocide, acknowledged that "[aJl! of
us must bitterly regret that we did not do more to prevent it. "36 Such
guilt spurred belated interest in the Rwandan situation, and the United
Nations took concrete action by creating an international criminal tribunal in late 1994."
C. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

After passing numerous resolutions on the tumultuous situation in
Rwanda both before and after the genocide,'" the Security Council eslablished the lCTR on Kovember 8,1994 with the passage of Resolution
955." The ICTR became the second Security CounCIl-implemented insti36. United Nations, Secretary~Gt'neral Statetnent on Receiving the Report of
the independcl'lt Inquiry Into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994
Genocide it} Rwanda (Dec. 10, 1999), available at http://ww\'I;,.un.org/News/ossg/
sgsm_rwanda.htm.
37. Mark Matthews, !us!il,,);' Stili Eludes 5tlrvivors of 1994 Genocide ifl Rwanda,
BALTIMORE Su,", May 6, 1996, at IA (quoting Alison desForges, who said thai the
ICTR sprang from an "excess of guilt" atter the world bod): failed to intervene
to prevent or to stop the slaughter the previou~ spring}.
38. Sec, e.g., U.N. Security Council Resolution 929, U.K SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3392nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/REs/920 (June 22,1994) (establishing a temporary
multinationaJ operation [or humanitarian purposes in Rv.'anda until the deployment of the expanded U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda); U.N. Security
Council Resolution 928, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 33915t Meeting, U.1\'. Doc.
S/Rrs/928 (June 20, 1994) (extending the mandate of the L:.N. Observer Mission
Uganda-Rwanda); U.N. "''emily Council Resolution 92.5, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3388th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/RES/92S (June 8,1994) (extending the mandate of
and deploying t\vo additional battalions of the U.N. Assistance Mission tor
Rwanda and settlement of the conflict in Rv"canda); U.?\:. Security Council
Resolution 918, UN. SCOR, 49th Sess" 3377th M('€ting, U.N. Doc. S/REs/9I8
(May 171 1994) (expanding the mandate of the U.N, Assistance Mission for
Rwanda and imposing an arms embargo on Rwanda); U.N. S('curity Council
Resolution 912, U.N. SCOl~; 49th Sess., 3368th Meeting, U.:\. Doc. S/REs/912
(Apr. 21, 1994) (adjusting the mandate of the UN. Assistance Mission for Rwanda
due to the new events in the Rwandan conflict); U.N. Security Council Rt-'Soiution
909, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess" 3358th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/RES/909 (Apr. 5, 1994)
(extending the mandate of the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda and implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement); U.N. Security CouncH Resolution 893,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3326th Meeting, e.N. Doc. S/RESi893 (jan. 6,1994)
(deploying the U.N. Assistance r.,Hssion tor Rwanda and implementing the
Arusha Peace Agreement),
39. U.N. Security Council Resolution 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd
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tuilon created to deal with violations of international humanitarian law
in a span of only a few years. In 1995, the ICTR initiated proceedings in
Arusha, Tanzania, In the subsequent seven years, the ICTR has amassed
a mixed but increasingly strong record in its prosecution of high level
genocidaires. Its success in achieving the other goals of post-genocide
Rwanda, however, has been more limited,

1. Background and Goals of the ICTR
International community inaction during the genocide quickly transformed into a post-genocide drive to establish an international tribunal
to hold the genocidaires accountable, Although the initial request for such
a tribunal came from the Government of Rwanda,'" members of the UN.
Security Council readily embraced the proposal.
The Rwandan government's goals for the ICTR were several. First,
the tribunal would involve the international community in seeking
accountability for the genocide, which would ensure impartiality and
avoid a perception of "victor's justice'! in Rwanda.'H Second, the
Rwandan government pragmatically believed that an international body
would have better access to criminals residing in foreign couniries,42
Third, and perhaps most important, the Rwandan government felt that
a high-level, international commitment to prosecuting the genocide
crimes would recognize that what happened in Rwanda rose to the level
of crimes against humanity and against the international community as
a whole. As the Rwandan ambassador diplomatically stated, the international community was "also harmed by the genocide."" Indeed,
reminding the international community of Rwanda's suffering continued to be important to Rwandans; when then-President Clinton arrived
at Kigali airport in 1998, one government official told a reporter, "to feel
the President of the United States shares our sadness and the tragedy
with us is very good ,"44 In short, achieving accountability for the genocide in Rwanda was a responsibility shouldered more broadly than by
Rwanda alone,
Meeting, U.N. Doc, S/REs/95.; (1994). The Annex to this resolution is the Statute
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, hereinafter lCTR Statute.
40, See Letter from Manzi Bakuramutsa,. Permanent Representative of
Rwanda to the President of the Se<:urity Council, Sept. 28, 1994, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 4, U.N. Doc. Sil994/1115,
41. Set' ICTR ESTABUSHMEl\:T, supra note 2 (Statement of Man.d Bakuramutsa
of Rwanda).
42. {d.
43. Id.
44. Bennct/ supra note 34,
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The international community shared many of the initial goals articulated by the Rwandan government. As the British Ambassador to the
t:.N. stated on approving the leTR Resolution; "It is our hope that the
Tribunal ... will prove by experience to be one which meets the objectives shared by the international community and Rwanda: that justice
should be done and that thereby the communities may be reconciled.""
Specific objectives of the international community in establishing the
leTR were to bring those respoosible to justice and to recognize that the
egregious crimes committed in Rwanda clearly violated international
law.'" As Nigerian Ambassador Ibrahim Gambar! stated, "the issue at
stake here is the need to punish collectively crimina 1acts against humanity; the issue is not geographical [ocation."47 Those who established the
lCTR also hoped to deter future genocide and ultimately contribute to
a process of reconciliation in Rwanda,
Additionally, the international community agmed with the need to
avoid any appearance of victor's justice" As the Rwandans themselves
recognized, the overwhelmed legal system in Rwanda had little prospect
of objectively, impartially and expeditiously moving through the enormous docket of cases before it. The United Nations Commission of
Experts, created by the Secretary General following the genocide, found
that the scale of crimes committed would pose daunting problems for
the Rwandan judicial system, and that the environment for domestic trials would be too raw to permit impartiality.'" The international community agreed that to change the culture of impunity a tribunal needed
to be established to handle these cases as neutrally as possible. 5O
One subtle difference between the international community's goals
and those of Rwanda can be glimpsed through the diplomatic statements
of the various ambassadors to the Security CounciL Both the international community and Rwanda stated the importance of recognizing the
genocide as a crime against all humanity. However, the Rwandan government was understandably especially concerned with creating a deterrent effect "'ithin Rwanda itself, while the international community saw
45. See ICTR

ESTABLISHMENT,

supra note 2 (statement of David Hannay of

the United Kingdom).
46. 1.1.
47. See ICTR ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 2 (statement of Ibrahim Gambarl
of Nigeria).
48. See ICTR ESTABlISHME[\.:;, supra note 2 (statement of Madeline Albright
of the United States); see also ICTR ESTABLISHMEl\T, supra note 2 (statement of
David Hannay of the United Kingdom),
49. See Letter Dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed
to the President of the Securitv Council, U.N. Doc. 5/1994/1125 (1994).
SO. See id.; ICTR ESTABliHME'J'i supra note 2 (statement of David Hannay
of the United Kingdom).
f
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the possibility for using the ICTR in a less context-specific way to send
a message across the world tha t perpetrators of genocide would be held
accountable for their actions,51 Yet both Rwanda and the members of the
Security Council hoped that an international tribunal could help to dispense justice as well as deter genocide in the future,
Despite this general convergence in goals for the ICTR, the government of Rwanda was ultimately disappointed with the Statute establishing the tribunal. Indeed Rwanda was sufficiently dissatisfied that it
offered the lone dissenting vole on November 8, 1994 when the Security
Council approved the Statute,52 The Rwandan government disagreed
less with the Statute's overall goals than with the means adopted for
achieving them, The Rwandan Ambassador named seven reasons why
his government could not support the Statote as drafted, First, he believc'<i
the temporal jurisdiction was inadequate to recognize the extent of the
planning for the genocide, much of which happened prior to 1994.53
Second, he predicted that the structure of the tribunaL with its limited
number of chambers and staff, would be overwhelmed with the "magnitude of the task awaiting [it],"" Third, the Statute did not adequately
prioritize which crimes would be prosecuted, and he feared that crimes
of genocide might not receive the highest level of attention,55 Fourth,
the Ambassador opposed the idea that countries involved with the Huto
regime could nominate candidates for pOSitions as ICTR judges}· Fifth,
he was dismayed that decisions about where to hold detainees would
be made not by Rwanda or the ICTR, but by other countries.'? Sixth, the
Ambassador protested the disparity in sentenCing possibilities between
the Rwandan penal code, which permitted capital punishment, and the
ICTR Statute, which did not. 53 Finally, the Ambassador expressed grave
reservations about the decision to locate the ICTR outside of Rwanda,'9
In short, the tribunal as structured fell short of what the Rwandan government deemed necessary to prosecute the crimes of genocide at the
level and intensity which it believed was merited, Whether these fears
were justified will be addressed below.
51. Compare {eTR ESTABUSH!\1ENT, supra note 2 (statement of David Hannay
of the United Kingdom), with ICTR ESTABLISHME~T; supra note 2 (statement of
Manzi Bakuramulsa of Rwanda),
52. Sec Voting Information, S/RES/955 (1994), availobleat ~ww.unbis.un,org/

(last visited Apr, t 2002).
53.
54,
55,
56
57.
58.
59,

ICTR
Id,
jd,

Id,
1d,
ld,
fd,

ESTAnu5H~ENT,

supra note 2 (statement uf Manzi Bakuramutsa),
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2. Structure, Jurisdiction and Procedures of the ICTR
The U.N. Security Council defined the structure, jurisdictional lim·
its, and basic procedural rules for the [CTR in the Annex to Resolution
955. Structurally, the rcTR Statute establishes three trial chambers in
Arusha. Tanzania, a registry also in Arusha, and an appeals chamber
and head prosecutor which the tribunal shares with the International
Criminal Tribunal ior Yugoslavia (lCTY). The Security Council estab·
lished this infrastructure-sharing with the ICTY to minimize costs.
The ICTR Statute lays out the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICTR.
Article I of the Statute mandates that the ICTR focus on cases that deal
with crimes of "genocide and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law" that occurred in Rwanda or that were perpetrated
by Rwandan citizens in neighboring states.6IlArticle 2 of the ICTR Statute
defines genocide as any of several acts "committed with intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group."6! The
ICTR also has authority to try cases of crimes against humanity&2 and
violations of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II. 6J

60. U.N. Security Council Resolution 955, UN. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd
Meeting, U.N. Doc. SiRES/90S § 1 (Nov. 8, 1994); see al,o ICTR Statute, supra
note 39, art. L
61. ICTR Statute, supra note 39, at art. 2. The listed acts are as follows: "(a)
Killing members of th(' group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members 01 the group; (e) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions 01 life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group.!; Genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit geno~
cide, and complicity in genocide are all listed as punishable acts, ld.
62, See ICrR Statute, supra note 39, at art. 3 (listing murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment~ torture, raper persecution on political, radat or religious grounds~ and other inhumane acts as crimes against
humanity),
63, See ICTR Statute. supm note 39, at art 4; Geneva Conventions; Additional Protocol II. The ICTR Statute lists these violations as including "(a) Violence
to life, health and physical or mental ""'Tell-being of persons, in particular murder.;'ls well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal puni&hment; (b) Collective punishment; (c) Taking of hostages; (d) Acts of
terrorism; (e-) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humHiating and
degrading treatment rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent a<;sauit;
(t) Pillage; (g) The passing of sentences ilnd the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording
aU the judicial guarantees which are recognized .1.5 indispensable by civilized
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Two jurisdictional features of the Statute are particularly noteworthy. First, Resolution 955 and the ICTR Statute limit the trihunal's jurisdiction by both date and subject matter.'4 The ICTR's jurisdiction is
limited temporally to crimes that occurred between January 1, 1994 and
December 31,1994, the period immediately before and immediately after
the genocide."' This temporal limitation has contributed to the tension
that exists between the ICTR and the Rwandan gO\·ernment. Second, the
ICTR Statute creates concurrent jurisdiction with the Rwandan national
courts, with primacy given to the international tribunal'"' Article 8 of
the ICTR Statute expressly states that the ICTR "shall have primacy over
the national courts of all states/' moreover, the tribunal is empowered
to intervene in any national trial subject to its jurisdiction and formally
request any state to defer to ICTR's competence.'7 Concurrent jurisdiction generally will be present in future attempts to prosecute genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal
Court, and this presents challenging issues of law and policy regarding
the relationships among different courts.6!l The Rwanda experience, discussed below, illuminates some of the difficult issues that can arise in
pursuing complementary national and international approaches to
accountabHity that do not work at cross purposes.
The U.N. Security Council ensured that states would be obligated
to cooperate with the ICTR by establishing the tribunal under Chapter
VI1 of the I..:.N. Charter." Resolulion 955 requires states to "cooperate fully"
petlples; (11) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts." ICTR Statute, supra
note 39, at art. 4.
64. Compare Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
art L fl'vailable at http://www.un.org/ict}'/basic/statut/statute.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002) (no temporal restriction) with ICTR Statute (temporal jurisdiction limited lo 1994), ,upm note 39.
65. U.N. Security Council Resolution 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd
Meeting, U.N. Doc. SjREs/9.55 § 1 (1994); E'er? also ICTR Statute, supra note 39, at
art 1. Note that in this respect the ICTR Statute differs from the Rwandan
Genocide Law, which covers offenses dating back to October 1, 1990. SCI? Organk
Law on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime
of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1, 1990
[h€'reinafter Rwandan Genocide Law].
66. TCTR Statute; supra note 39. at art. 8
67. ld.
68. The jurisdictional provisions ot the Rome Statute of the International
Criminai Court and issues of complementarity are dtscussed infra, iu Section F3.
69. See U.N. Charter, Ch. Vfl; PAVL J. MAG"ARELLA, lV'STiCE '" AFRICA,
RWANDA'S GE:-;OCroE, ITS COURTS, A!,-;D THE UN CRIVlJNAL TRlBUNA:" 43 (2000) (By
going the U.N. Chapler VII route, the Security Council obliged all U.K. member states to cooperate with the tribunal and to honor any lawful requests it
makes for assistance under the ICTR Statute}
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with the ICTR, to formulate domestic law measures necessary to implement the resolution, and to comply with orders and requests issued by
the TCTR,7o Through Resolution 955, the U.N, Security Council also
"urge[d] states and non-governmental organizations to contribute funds,
equipment and services to the lCTR."71 In short, the ICTR looks to many
states for assistaoce in fulfilTing its goals.
The ICTR's rules of procedure and decision come from the broad
outlines Taid out in the ICTR Statute, from the practice of the ICTY, and
from the judges of the ICTK A dynamic common to the creation of other
international courts arose in formulating rules of procedure for the lCTR:
how best to meld the common law and civil law systems into a single
functioning tribunal?" An interesting aspect of the civil-common law
debate is the varying treatment accorded to witnesses in the two systems, In Rwanda's civil!aw system, and under its rules of criminal procedure, witnesses for the prosecution provide written statements, and
testify only if the defense seeks to cross-examine them." In the common
law system, evidence for the prosecution is adduced only by having
each witness testify." The hvo approaches make some trade-offs between
efficiency and transparency?' Cltimately, the lCTR is more balanced
70. L.:\", Security Council Resolution 955, U,N, SCOR, 49th 5e"., 3453rd
Meeting, U.N, Doc SiREs/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), Article 28 of the tCTR Statute clarifies states' obligations "'lith regard to cooperation and judicial assistance. States
are required to cooperate with the ICTR in investigating and punishing violations of humanHarian law, and to "comply without undue delay vdth any request
for 3s!:>lstance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber/' including requests to locate
individuals, take testimony. give up evidence, serve documents, arrest or detain
individuals. and surrender or transfer accused individuals to the ICTR. See ICTR
Statute, supra note 39, at art. 28. Obviously, the obligation to surrender or transfer individuals located vvithin another country is controversial. In practice, the
ICTR tries to avoid direct confrontation vvhen possible, through the use of negotiations and other more subtle tactics. However, it reserves the right to report
non-conlplying states to the Security CounciL See Frederik Harhoff, Consonance
or Rivalry? Calibrating the Efforts 10 Prosecute War Crimes;n National and Internati(mai
Tribunal" 7 DUKE J, CO"". & ]'JT'L L 571, at 580-81 (1997).
71. LN. Security Council Resolulion 955, U,N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd
;"feeling, "US, Doc, S/RES/95S CNov, 8, 1994).
72. See generafly h'TER:"iATI0~ALAl\TI :-.iATIONAL PROSEcuno;,\; OF CHIMES UNDER
INl1::r(l''';KrtO!\AL LAW: CURRE'lT DEvELOPME)J1S (Horst Fischer, Claus Kress, & Sascha
Roll Lilder, eds., 200]).
73. See Reply of the Government of the Republic of Rwanda to the Report
of Amnesty International Entitled "Rwanda: Unfair Trials-Justice Denied" (1997),
available at http://www.nvandemb.org/prosecution/reply.htm{last visited Aug.
2, 2002} Ihereinafter RWANDAN RESPONSE TO AMl\ES1Y INTERNAEOl\AL],
74. See id.
75. Compare RWA\JDA",· RESPONSE TO AMf\;ESTY INTERNATIONAL supra, note 73,
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towards the Common law system, while the Rwandan genocide trials
are conducted within the civHlaw system, as will be discussed below?'
Thus established, the ICTR began its work in earnest in 1995.'7

3.

Achievements of the ICTR

As of October 2002, the ICTR has produced a small but ever-growing body of case law. It has completed 11 trials, with the following results:
five prisoners have received life imprisonment; three more have received
sentences of 25, 13, and 12 years, respectively. One suspect has been
acquitted, and the acquittal was upheld on appea]7' One defendant who
received a life sentence at trial still has an appeal pending. As of October
2002, the ICTR had 61 detainees in custody. In addition to those whose
trials have been completed and who are serving sentences, 22 individuals are currently On trial in 8 separate proceedings; 31 others presently
await triaJ.7' Those convicted, on trial. or awaiting trial encompass a
broad spectrum of Rwandan society. induding national and local political officials, military omcers, businessmen, students, doctors, pastors,
musicians, and journalists; they include the pastor who refused to help
his Adventist congregation, and the man who ran the hate radio station,
Radio TeJeuision Libre des Milles Collines." In less than a decade, more
than 230 witnesses have appeared before the Tribunal to give testimony
in support of the prosecution or defense, and the lCTR has decided more
than 500 moti ons.Sl
with AMNESTY INTER)lATIOt>..AL, RW,;,NDA: THE TROUBLED COURSE OF JUSTICE, AFR
47/015/2000 (Apr. 26, 2000), available at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/lndexl
AFR470152000 (last visited Aug. 2, 2002) [hereinafter TROLBLED COL'RSE OF
JUSTJCE].

76. Sec, e.g._

r

VlRG1:\lA 1.·10RRIS & MICHAEl E ScHARF, THE I~lER~A~lONAL CRIM~

49, 416 (1.998) (The ICTY and the ICTR essentially
followed "the adversarial approach of the common law systems," although they
inCOrpOftlted elements of the inquisitorial dvillaw system.). For more information about ICTR procedures beyond the scope of thi5 chapter see ICTR Rules
of Procedure and Evicience available at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot.ENGL1SH/rules/310501/index.htm (last visited May 17, 2002).
77, See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Tributlal at a Glance,
available a/ http://www.ictr.org/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
78. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, [eTR Defaiflees-Status
on I:ebruary 8, 2002, aFaiiable a/ http://www.ictr.org/ENGLlSHlfactsheets/
detainee.htm (last visited Oct. 10,2002). Other individuals have been detained
since Feb, 8, 2002. See http:;"fWW\v-ictr,org,
79. Sec rd.
80. See id.
81. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Tribuna] at a
INAL TRIBU~AL FOR RWA"OA

J

J
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Two trials are particularly signiiicant for international criminal justice. First, on September 2, 1998, Jean Paul Akayesu became the first individual convicted of the crime of genocide by an international criminal
court.b2 Akayesu, the former Bourgmestre of Taba in Gitaranla province,
was found guilty on nine (Qunts, including genocide, direct and public
incitement to commit genocide, and crimes against humanity (torture,
rape, and other inhumane actsl.'" Second, on September 4, 1998, the
lCTR Trial Chamber sentenced former Rwandan Prime Minister Jean
Kambanda to life in prison; Kambanda had pled guilty to counts of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to
cOlllmlt genocide, complicity in genocide! and crimes against humanity" The Kambanda decision showed that international tribunals would
not necessarily shy away from punishing heads of state for heinous acts
taken during their terms of office-it may set a precedent for future ICC
or tribunal action. The prosecution of national leaders such as Kambanda
may present special opportunities for cooperation between international
and national aclors, as a head of state may fear international judgment
more than the judgment of a domestic court over which he or she has
influence, or continues to have vestiges of influence after leaving office.
The deterrent effect on criminal activities by heads of state may therefore be greater in the international tribunal.
4.

Effectiveness 01 the ICTR

Rwanda's relationship with the ICTR has been strained from the
Tribunal's inception, because of Rwanda's unmet expectations and
because of the performance of the ICTR itself, One of the most important sources of disagreement between Rwanda and the ICTR has been
the Tribunal's limited temporal jurisdictIOn. On the one hand, the lim·
ited jurisdiction provides a clear mandate and scope of power to the
Rwandan tribunaL This sort of bright-line starting and stopping point
Glance, Fact Sheet No, I, June 2001, available at http://www-ictwrg/ENGLTSH(factsheets/Lhtm (last visited Feb. 20, 2002).
82. Sce Tile Prosecutor "- Jcall·Pauj Akayrsu, ICTR·96-4-T (Sept 2, 1998), amil·
able at http://www.ictr.org{lastvisitedSept.29.20(2).This decision was subsequently upheld by the ICTR Appeals Olamber in The Pf'L'Sccutor '1.'. leal1~P!1Ul AktlYBU
(June l, 2001), availaMe at http://www-ictcorg (last visited Sept. 29, 2002).
83. See id.
84. See The Prosentlor v. Jean Kambrwdu. ICTR-97-23-S (May 1/ 1998), avai!able al http://www.ictr.org(last visited Sept. 29, Z002). This decision was subsequently upheld by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in lean K"mbandn 1'. The
Pmsecultlr, ICTR-97-23·A (Oct. 19,2000), avai/aille at http://wIVw.ictr.org (last
visited Mar, 221 2002).
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makes clear where the international community's responsibility ends
and where the Rwandan government's responsibility begins. Additionally, an unlimited temporal mandate would have further congested
the already slow [CTR process, possibly preventing important leaders
of the 1994 genocide from going to trial. On the other hand, the Rwandan
government has criticized the limited jurisdiction for failing to cover
most of the planning period for the genocide, and has argued that a tribunal "which refuses to consider the causes of the genocide in Rwanda
and its planning ... will not contribute to eradicating the culture of
impunity or creating a clinlate conducive to national reconciliation:'1l5
Interestingly, the limited jurisdiction now allows the Rwandan government to avoid being held accountable for many of the violations of
humanitarian law that observers say have occurred since 1994.'" These
include not just reprisal killings in Rwanda, but massacres that have
occurred in Rwandan-controlled areas of the Democratic Republic of
Congo since J994.87 The failure to hold the RPF and other Tutsis accountable will be discussed in more detail below.
Anoth!'r frustrated expectation for the Rwandan government centers on the ICTR's refusal to impose the death p!'nalty. The government
has disagreed with the tribunal's sentencing possibilities for two reasons. First, because the lCTR Statute forbade capital punishment, those
being tried for the most egregious crimes in Arusha faced lesser sentences than those being tried for lesser crimes in Rwanda, where the
death penalty was available. Second, some of those convicted by the
ICTR were expected to serve their sentences in Europe. gg As one RPF
official remarked, "It doesn't fit our definition of justice to think of the
authors of the Rwandan genocide sitting in a full-service Swedish prison
with a television."" A third reason, not officially articulated by the
Rwandan government, but suspected by several Rwanda observers, is
that the sentencing disparity seems hypocritical to the Rwandan
government; the same international community that sat by and let the

85. Sec ICTR ESIABLlSP'MENT, supra note 2 (statement of Manzi Bakuramutsa),
See DES FORGES, supra note 21 (describing RPF killings of persons suspected to have been involved in the genocide, after the fighting hnd ended).;
Christina M. CarroJI, An As:-e5sment 0./ the Role and Effectiveness (.1 the lnterllational
Crimina! Tribunal for Rwanda and the RUHmdan National Jusfice System in Dealing
witll ti,e Mass Alrocitirs of 1994. IS B.U. ["T'L 1....1. 163, 175-76 (2000).
87. See e.g.~ Chris McGreal, Genocide Tribuna! Ready to Indict FirM Tui.;;is,
86.

GCARDL'" (LONDON), Apr. 5, 2002, at 16.

88. Denmark, Norway, and Belgium, as weB as a few African countries,
offered to incarcerate those (onvicted at the ICTR. See TCTR, International
Cooperation 'with the Tribanal, FACT SHEET No.6, available at http://www.ictr.org.
89, GOCREVlTCH supra note 1, at 255.
t
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genocide unfold now takes the moral high ground about how the death
penalty violates international human rights norms. 90
Rwanda has also been largely disappointed by the actual performance of the ICTR. First, the ICTR has been seen as unnecessarily slow;
the Rwandan government does not want the quest for "deluxe justice"
to corne at the expense of urgency.91 Second, Rwanda has been frustrated
by episodes of procedural bungling that resulted in suspects being
released. For a time in late 1999, Rwanda had neither an ambassador
nor a permanent representative at the ICTR. This resulted from a rift
over the release of a particularly notorious prisoner, Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza, who was released following some procedural irregularities." That situation was finally remedied in 2000, when the ICTR agreed
to reconsider its decision, and Barayagwiza now awaits trial in Arusha,93
But the Rwandan government remains concerned that "[t]he performance of the tribunal thus far has been disappointing," citing such factors as poor tribunal organizational structure, incompetent tribunal
personnel, and tribunal leadership that shows a perceived "hostility
towards cooperation with the Government of Rwanda" in making its
assessment." Third, the Rwandan government remains frustrated by
the cost of the proceedings at the ICTR, seeing large sums of money dispensed on relatively few cases. As the government noted in a report
published in 2001, the Rwandan national system could have achieved
more "if the international community had put at our disposal resource[s]
of the magnitude that has for example been squandered on the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda."95 Rwandans feel that the
ICTR has never realized its initial promise to efficiently conduct and
conclude high-profile criminal trials.

90. Jose Alvarez, Crimes of State, Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24
YALE

J.

INT'L

L 365, 407 (1999).

91. Official Website of the Rwandan Government, GENOCTDE, at
http://www.rwandal.com/gov [hereinafter RWANDA!\" GOVERNMENT].
92. See Chris Simpson, Rwanda Tribunal's Shaky Progress, available at

http:// news.bbc.co. uk/hi/ english/ world/ africa/ newsid_645000 / 645070.stm
(Feb. 16,2000) (last visited Apr. 1, 2002). This article and the incident sparked
by Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza's release illustrate the Rwandan government's concern that the ICTR and western observers value the rights of defendants over
those of the victims.

93. See id.
94. Official web site of the Rwandan Embassy in the United States, THE
JUDICIAL SYSTE\11:.J RWANDA: A REPORT ON JUSTlCE, at http://www.rwandaemb.org/

justice/justice.htm (last visited on July 14, 2002) [herehwfter JUDICIAL

SYSTEM IN

RWANDA].

95. See RJ,.VANDAN RESPONSE TO A~NESTY I:';TERNATTO,"AL, supra note 73.
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Finally, the tribunal', inaccessibility also complicates the average
Rwandan's relationship with the lCTR. The lCTR's location in Arusha
makes it difficult for Rwandans to attend court proceedings or hear news
of [CTR trials. The international community located the tribunal in a
neutral country to enhance the appearance of impartiality and fairness,
but that decision only exacerbated Rwanda's feelings that the nation
was being denied justice. The Rwandan Ambassador to the Security
Council noted in voting against the ICTR Statute that it was deeply
important for the tribunal to be located in Rwanda so that Rwandans
could see up close what it means to fight against impunity; this lesson
was lost by situating the tribunal in Arusha. Only recently have
Rwandans been able to get news from the lCTR in Kinyarwanda, the
national language of Rwanda." Although the Rwandan Government
has acknowledged certain lCTR successes, it is dear that its overall sense
of ICTR performance is negative."
Popular sentiment toward the ICTR is no different. When ICTR Chief
Prosecutor Carla del Ponte traveled to Kigali in Tune 2002, she was met
with protests from 3,500 genocide survivors marching with placards
inscribed, """0 justice from TCTR"'" This sentiment is best and most consistently articulated by a group called lBUKA, which is the principal
Rwandan organization for survivors of the genocide. IBUKA has been
critical of the pace of the ICTR proceedings; their view is that the slow
pace diminishes the value of the justice that is served.'" Victims' groups
also protest certain procedures like fee-splitting between defense counsels and their clients, whereby defense lawyers share some of their remuneration with their clients so that they will continue to be retained as
96, For example,. in 2000, the ICTR undertook a major outreach program
towards Rwanda. A reporter from Radio Rwanda was pennanently based at the
ICTR to broadcast daily reports from the trial chambers. He also traveled to The
Hague to report on an appellate proceeding. See Sixth Annual Report of the
lnternational Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other SerioLls Violations of International Humanitarian Law in
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and
Other Such Violations Committed In the Territory of Neighboring States Between
Tanuary 1, and December 31, 1994, 56th Sess., LS. Doc. AI56!351-S/200l /863,
available at http://www.ictr.org{lastvisited Apr. L 2002),
9T See JUOICIAL SYSTEM IN R'YVANOA, supra note 94.
98, Gene",ide Survivors DemonsTrale Against lCTR Chief, TRTN (J une 28, 2002),
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/printableI200206280543,html (last visited Aug, 2, 2002) {hereinafter GcnocirJe Survivors Demonstrate],
99. Stef Vandeginste, Rwanda: Dealing with Getlocide and Crimes Against
Humanity in the Context of Armed Cor~fiict and Failed PoWica! Tnmsitiotl , in BERYING TIlE PAST: MAKlNC:; PEACE AND Doe\JG JUSTICE AFTER elVH. CONFUL'T, at 31 C\igeJ
BIggar ed" 2001).
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lawyers,lOO They view this practice as unjustly enriching suspected genaddaires whiJe they await triaLltL
International opinion of the lCTR is more positive, Although scholars recognize that many of Rwanda's complaints about delays and poor
management are valid, the lCTR has nevertheless achieved a remarkable number of high-level indictments and convictions. Moreover, in the
painstaking accumulation of evidence prepared for trial, the ICTR has
amassed inlpressive documentation of many of the worst acts of genocide in Rwanda, The ICTR therefore goes far toward meeting one goal
expressed at its creation: international recognition of the scope of crimes
against humanity that occurred in Rwanda in 1994, These positive
achievements of the ICTR, howe,'er, seem to be directed more at the
international community than at Rwanda; where the Rwandans gener~
ally feel disconnected from the justice being meted out in Arusha, the
international community senses the establishment of important precedents for international human rights law102 111is difference in approach
to the ICTR's record is understandable given the seemingly subtle difference in goals elaborated at the IcrR's formation: in addition to seeking justice by holding perpetrators accountable, Rwanda wanted an
emphasiS on the deterrent effect within Rwanda, while the international
community was more concerned with the ICTR's potential impact on
human rights world"\\'ide.1d3
One particularly serious criticism of the lCTR is only recently rising to the fore, namely the tribunal's inability to prosecute Tutsis who
are accused of committing war crimes, Although the tribunal's mandate
encoDlpasses prosecution ot crimes against humanity conlmitted by both
100. Rwanda; Rejormslntrodllced ilt lhe International Criminal Tribunal, IRIN
(july 9, 2002),
101. Genocide Survivors DemOtlstratc.. sUfna note 98; Betsy Pisik, Frustration
in Rwanda, \VA5H. TIMES, July 29, 2002, at AJ4,
102, Vandeginste, supra note 99, at 230-31 (2001),
103. In the statements accompanying the establishment of the ICTR, fDT
example, Ambassador Hannay of the United Kingdom emphasized the global
aspect of the crimes that were committed in Rwanda, arguing that the "'human
rjghts violations committed in Rwanda ... concerned the international community as a whole" and he situated the need for justice and "deterrence for the
future" in this area of international concern, See lCTR ESTAl1-LlSHME-l.JT, supra note
2 (Statement of Da\'id Hannay of the United Kingdom), By contrast, Ambassador
Bakuramutsa of Rwanda acknmvledged that the international-.:ommunity had
important interests in the prosecution of those accused of committing genocide~
but his statement is replete 'with the very particular needs and concerns for jus~
tiee, deterrence, and reconciliation within Rwanda itself. See TeTR ESTABUSE!...lENT, supra note 2 (Statement of Manzi Bakuramutsa of Rwanda); see also the
discussion of Ambassador Bakuramutsa's concerns, supra Section C.I.
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Hutu and Tutsi, in reality only Hutu suspects have been brought before
the ICTR. Prosecutor Del Ponte announced her intention to investigate
suspected Tutsi war criminals in 2001, but as yet she has issued no indictments. lO' According to Del Ponte, Rwandan President Paul Kagamehead of the RPF in 1994-has "not delivered on a pledge to cooperate."1D'
This stalemate again raises the specter of "victor's justice," a specler thaI
would counteract all the eiforts being made to dismantle the culture of
impunity in Rwanda.
Because the ICTR as constituted cannot meet all the goals Rwanda
has for post-genocide accountability, and because the ICTR handles only
a small number 01 cases, the Rwandan national judicial system, which
handles the vast majority of genocide trials, plays a critical role in the
long-term process of eliminating the cycle of impunity and violence.
D. NATIONAljUDlCIAl RESPONSE

Despite the existence of the ICTR, the Rwandan national judicial
system has borne and will continue to bear the brunt of the genocide
trials. Because of its resource limitations and limited mandate, the ICTR
ultimately cannot resolve the grim situation in Rwanda-its processes
take too long and its resources are too limited. 'l;loreover, the United
States and other nations have mentioned the need for an "endgame strategy" for the ad hoc war crimes tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia."~
It seems highly unlikely that the genocide trials will be finished before
the ICTR is disbanded. When that occurs, the Rwandan system will go
forward alone.
Most important for Rwanda, the ICTR's goals are more internationally focused, aimed in part at deterring leaders in other nations from
carrying out similar campaigns of violence. Rwanda's goals! as noted
above, place much more emphasis upon achieving justice inside Rwanda,
and upon the deterrent effect wit/lin Rwanda and the importance of
breaking down Rwanda's culture of impunity. For this reason, even an
JCTR with infinite capacity and resources could not play the role that
the Rwandan legal system must play to achieve this ultimate goal.
104. See Marc Lacey, Tribunal Says R,vondll Is Stalling Inquiry Info 1994 KiUirrgs,

N.Y.

TTMES,

Sept. 7, 2002, at A3.

105. Chris McCreal, Genocide Tribunal Ready to Indict First Tutsis, GUARDIA:\l
(LOMJON),

Apr. 5, 2002, al16.

106. See Hirondelle Foundation, US PushiJlg Closure Strategyfor UN Triblll1a!s,
Says E!1'tJoH, avaiiabk fit http://www.hirondeHe,org/hirondellc.nsf/ (last visited
Mar, 17, 2002) (discussing remarks made by U.S, Ambassador for \'Var Crimes
Issues Pierre Richard Prosper, suggesting that the [CTR should wind down by
20()7 or 2(08).

110

Accounfability for Atrocllies

1. Background and Goals
The 1994 genocide left Rwandan legal institutions, like the rest of
civil society, in tatters, Rwanda's most urgent problems arise from its
limited human and physical capacity to address the massive legal challenges posed by the genOCide. The statistics on Rwanda's diminished
post-genocide legal capacity are grim. Two-thirds of Rwanda's judges
and attorneys fled or were killed during the months of fighting, leaving
the country largely devoid of experts on the lawl(J7 Law enforcement
mechanisms such as the police force ceased to exist for a time following
the genocide wb The system lacks both trained investigators (only 39
were left after the genocide, compared to 193 before)li)9 and the resources
needed to pursue investigations, especially in rural areas. 1I0 The lack of
staff capacity and resources for the legal system means that the trials of
those accused of genocide have proceeded at a glacial pace. As of March
2001, the most recent month for which figures are available, onlv 5,310
trials had been completed. III By the Rwandan government's most recent
estimate, it would take 200 years to prosecute all those accused of genDcide if the courts maintained their current speed. ll2
The second capacity problem is that of the overwhelmed jail facilities. As of 2001, 106,000 indIviduals remained incarcerated on genocide
charges in jails with an official capacity of only 30,OOO.1Il The terrible
conditions created by such overcrowding have been the subject of many
complaints by human rights organizations;114 as one international
observer described the Kigali prison, "the prison revealed wall-to-wall
people, with the prisoner hierarchy determined by those who had to
stand, those who could sil, those who could lie down, and those who
could lie down in the shade."lI5ln 2001, 708 detainees died in prison as
a result of these conditions. Amnesty International has reported that
107. JCDICIAL SYSTEM IN RWANDA, supra note 94.
108, Id
109. Id,
110. Jennifer Widner, Courts and Democracy in Pastcof~flid Transitions: A Social
Scientist's Perspective on thE African Case, 95 AM, J. INTL L 64 (2001),
111. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 2002: Rwanda.

HunulI/ Rights Developmcnt~, available (It http://hrw,org/wr2k2/africa9,html Oast
visited Aug. 2, 2002) [herelnafter HRWatch 2002].
112. See R\.'\"A~DA!\ GOVERNMENT, supra note 91.
11.3. UNITED STATES DEP:\RTMENTOF STATE, CoU\iTRY REPORT or-,; HUMAK RJGHTS

PRACTlCES.

RWANDA

(2001) [hereinafter

STATE DEPARTME:-JT

2001 HC\'{AN

RIGHTS

REPORT]'
114, See HRWatch 2002, supra note Ill.
115, Peter H. Sennett Working with Rwanda 1bward the Dom£stic PrvseclJtior.
oj Genocide Crimes, 12 51. JOH~'S J. LEGAL CO~·lME.sT" 425, 438 (1997),
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these conditions amount to "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment"H6
The overwhelmed jail facilities combined with the slow pace of the trials raises important due process concerns for defendants.
Rwanda's goal since 1994 has been to rebuild its capacity so that it
can move expeditiously to bring these thousands to justice. The genocide trials permit the Rwandan government to dispense justice by individualizing culpability for the genocide. Instead of treating all Hutus as
guilty, the trials allow those who participated in the genOcide to be
brought to justice, and those who did not participate to be exonerated
in the eyes of the state and, more important, in the eyes of the communities where they have had to live for years under clouds of suspicion.
Convinced that the ICTR is located too far away to help teach Rwandans
about justice and accountability, the Rwandan government also hopes
to provide a sound model of accountability at home. Although the trials are situated within and are an integral part of the government's
broader effort to achieve reconciliation, this particular aspect of the legal
response to genocide exclusively emphasizes individual accountability
and specific deterrence for those convicted.
2. Jurisdiction and Procedures of the Rwandan National Courts
Rwanda had no dom<'stic genocide law prior to the events of 1994,
although it had previously ratified the U.N. Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. J17 Thus, the country established an entirely neW substantiv<, and procedural framework ex post
facto. with all the practical, political and legal problems such an approach
entails. On August 30, 1996, Rwanda adopted the Organic Law on the
Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting the Crime of
Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1,
1990.''' The 1996 law divided genOCide-related crimes into four categories, Category One covers the most serious criminals; including I'plan_
ners, organizers# instigators, supervisors, and leaders of the crime of
genocide or of a crime against humanity," those who acted from positions of power to foster the genocide, "notorious murderers who by
virtue of zeal or excessive malice" stood apart from the average participant in the killings, and individuals who committed acts of sexual

note 75.
117. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, U.!\:.TS. No. 1021, Vol. 78 at 277 (1951) (defining genocide a"d lay116. TROCBLED COUI{SE OF JUSTICE, supra

ing out a series of punishable acts).
118. See Rwandan Genocide Law? supra note 65 .
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torture.!" Category Two consists of individuals who perpetrated or conspired to con1mlt intentional homicide or serious assault ending in
death. "" Category Three deals with persons who committed other serious assaults. "12J Category Four is reserved for those who committed
offenses against property.122
U

All of the trials of persons charged under the Organic Law are conducted in the regular Rwandan judiCIal system; the government decided
against creating special bodies to handle genocide trials. m The Rwandan
courts use a civil law system, which has two primary implications for
how the trials of suspectedgenocidaires are conducted. First in civil law
trials, the prosecution is not obliged to put witnesses for the prosecution on the stand for cross-examina hon. Instead; witnesses provide written statements in advance, and defendants may specifically request that
a witness appear for cross-examination. The Rwandan government
believes that one merit of this system is that it helps judges move through
any given case more qUickly than if all testimony had to be offered in
person in front of the cour!.'" Second, in the civil!aw system, the judge
has more discretion to determine what evidence should be submitted at
trial; such discretion is consistent with penal codes in France and Belgium,
which also emphasize the discretion of the judge. l25
The Rwandan courts have introduced two innovations to move
through the backlog of cases. The first innovation is the introduction of
the plea bargain, which had not preViously existed in Rwanda. Chapter
III of the Rwandan Genocide Law sets forth a plea-bargaining system
whereby perpetrators can receive reduced sentences in exchange for
guilty pleas, a measure that aims to reduce the backlog of cases. l26 The
introduction of the plea-bargaining system was contentious in Rwanda,
traditionally a civil law nation where plea-bargaining was seen as a foreign, common law practice.'" The guilty pleas ran counter to the deep
passions accompanying the prosecution of each crime; the efficiency
gains were directly countered by a sense that people were recei\>ing less
119.
120.
121.
122.

Jd. al art. 2
ld.
Id.
Id.

123. RWA:\"DAN RESPONSE TO A\1:'\lP:S1Y I:'JIERNATlON;L,

supra note 73.

124. Id.

125. ld.
126. Rwandan Genocide Law, supra note 63, art. 2. See also Sennett. supm
note 115.
127. See Lawyers Committee for Human Hights, Prosecuting Genocide in
Rwanda: The ICTR and NaJional Trials 50~51 (July 1997) rMost traditional civil
law systems did not allow plea-bargaining and some viewed it as distasteful if
not immoral."}.
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than full justice,US However! this controversy may be somewhat mitigated because Chapter III's leniency is forbidden to individuals whose
alleged crimes fall within the most serious Category One acts. 12 '
The second innovation is the Gisovu project, a release program that
seeks to achieve faster justice for many of those in detention. The Gisovu
project focuses on detainees who have no files, and on elderly or ill prisoners, among others. Starting in late 2000, prosecutors accompany these
detainees and prisoners to their home communities. where the prosecutors ask if anyone has testimony against them. If no one comes forward with any testimony, the suspects are freed. DO Among those who
are investigated through the Gisovu project, between 30 percent and 40
percent are released. 1-31

3.

Achievements and Remaining Challenges

Since 1994, the Rwandan government, with the help of international
aid, has made great efforts to increase its number of qualified judicial
personnel and improve the bask office infrastructure for all of the country's trial and appellate courts. According to a study released by the
Rwandan Embassy in the United States, the overall number of judicial
personnel such as judges, prosecutors, investigators and others is now
higher than it was before 1994,132 An increase in judicial personnel, however, is only a partial indicator of the efficacy and fairness of the Rwandan
judicial system. Domestic trials began in December 1996, and the number of trials has increased in each subsequent year, but more than 100,000
individuals remain in jails around the country.1" Only 5,300 trials had
concluded as of May 2001, which is only 5 percent of the total docket.
Another 1,335 prisoners have been released through the Gisovu project
as of May 2001. 134 The plea-bargain innovation has been less effident
than anticipated because each confession must be examined for validity before the prosecutor can move forward with Chapter 1lI leniency.
With some 15,000 persons having confessed (a little more than 10 percent of the total in detention), even this device will take time to implement, and will only reduce the backlog of caseS to around 90,000

128. See Sennett, supra note 115.
129. Rwandan Genocide La\'\', supra note 65, art 3.
130. HRWatch 2002, supra note 111.
131. STATE DEPAIUMEI'.j2001 HL1viAN RIGHTS REPGRT, supra note 113, at §l(d).
supra note 94.
133. STATE DEPAtnMENT 2001 HeM"" RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 113.
132. ]UDlCIAL SYSTEM If',; R'i.\'Af',;DA,

134. ld.
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suspects."'" Despite the real progress that has been made in strengthening legal capacity in the country, the challenge posed in absolute terms
by these high numbers remains almost the same as it was in 1994.

4. Effectiveness of the Rwandan Courts
[n the early days following the genocide, observers sharply criticized Rwandan courts for failing to afford proper procedural protections to defendants, and they feared that the domestic courts would be
used as illegitimate tools of victor's justice rather than appropriately
constituted and impartial courts of law. The early genocide trials were
held inconspicuously, to avoid western attention to procedural deficiencies like lack of defense counsel, poor quality of investigations, and
speedy judgments that bordered on hastiness Llh At the same time, until
international help came forth, this slluation was caused more by practical and logistical problems than by any lack of commitment to due
process. Given the Rwandan judicial system's miserable situation imme·
diotely following the genocide, little more could be expected.
Portions or the international con1munity continue to monitor and
criticize the Rwandan legal system's response to the genocide. Human
rights groups regularly issue scathing reports condemning Rwanda's
treatment of its prisoners and the Rwandan trial process.'" In 2000,
Amnesty International released a report, The Troubled Course of Justice,
which harshly criticized six elements of Rwanda's legal system: deten·
tion without trial; re-arrest of suspected genocidaires after formal acquittal in the courts; overcrowded, inhuman jail conditions; torture and
ill·treatment; unlawful detention of civilians in military custody; and
imposition of the death penalty.;38 Amnesty also noted that even in trials where defendants had attorneys and more opportunities to prepare
their defenses, standards of fairness and procedure varied widely
between defendants, with more prominent defendants often receiving
better treatment than indigent and uneducated individuals. '39
135, HRWatch 2002# supra note ltl. As this book went to press~ several thousand prisoners were released, pending their appearance at gacaca trials, discussed in Section E, infra. This brings the number of genocide suspects in
Rwandan prisons down to roughly 80,000 persons. See Rwanda; Thousands l~f
Genocide Suspects Released from SoUdarify Cat1lp~1 HIRONDEllE Nn','s AGENCY, May
6,2003.

supra note L at 343-44.
137, See e.g., TROt:BlED COURSE OF Jt:STICE supra note 75; HRWatch 2002, supra
note 111; HUMAN RIGHTS \AlATCH, VVORLO REPORT 2001 RWAt-.:OA, HUMA~ RIGHTS
DEVELOPMEN1S, amilabie al http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl / africa/rwanda.hlml (last
visited Sept. 28, 2002).
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139. See id.
136. GOUREVIH.':H,

j

Accountability in the Affermath of R-rl)anda's Genocide

115

The Rwandan government readily and regretfully admits that its trial
system still has problems. It acknowledges !hat "[j]udidal institutions in
Rwanda have at the best of times been ineffective, run by poorly paid
and ill trained personnel. At worst, these institutions have been partisan
and corrupt, staffed with many political appointees eager to please the
powers that be, the highest bidder, or both.""o This self-criticism is an
encouraging sign, as it shows the possibility that the post-genocide government is willing to establish a system that values accountability for alL
not just for its political opponents. The government consistently asks the
international community, however, to carefully consider the broader context in which these institutions are operating. In its response to Amnesty
International's Troubled Course of fuslice Report, the government comments that the international community "proceeds on the assumption
that the same standards which apply in states wi!h abundant resources
and limited number of criminal suspects should equally apply to a country like Rwanda with limited resources and an almost insurmountable
problem of having to render justice for around 100,000 suspects now in
custody awaiting triaL"l41 The government's view is that the international community should adjust its standards enough to be realistic about
Rwanda's still weak legal capacity.
The dialogue between the government of Rwanda and human rights
groups helps focus attention on the ways in which the Rwandan national
judicial system can continue to be improved. On balance, however, the
Rwandan government has gone a long way toward achieving its goals.
The legal infrastructure is substantially impro\'ed from its 1994 condition, and as the United States Department of State has stated in each of
its j'luman Rights reports from 1999 through 2002, the "vast majority"
of genocide trials meet international standards.!" Rwanda is therefore
starting to provide a visible model of accountability at home, meeting
one of its critical objectives.
One serious unaddressed concern remains, ho¥,rever and that is the
question of whether it is "victor's justice" that is being pursued in
Rwanda. The Organic Law permits prosecution of all crimes arising after
f
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the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990 143 The RPF itself has been accused
of (and admitted to) crimes against humanity during the civil war and
its aftermath, but those responsible have not been called before the judicial system to account for their crimes. As the Rwandan government
becomes increasingly implicated in human rights abuses conducted by
its forces and allies in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.''' this
lack of accountability goes from being worrisome to being absolutely
counter to the goal of eradicating the culture of impunity. The unwillingness to hold itself to the same standards it demands of others is characteristic of previous regimes, both Hutu and Tutsi, whose actions built
mistrust, fear, and hatred instead of tolerance and inclusion. If the
Rwandan government remains committed to its original goal of eradicating the culture of impunity in Rwanda, then it must change its
approach in this area.
Notwithstanding this remaining untackled issue of "victor's justice," the real achievements of the Rwandan justice system merit continued international community support, both finandal and technical.
International aid should continue to finance capacity-building projects
that focus on all levels of the judiciary from the investigators to the
judges, as well as projects that provide legal counsel to indigent defendants. Even with this support, however, the Rwandan government is
unlikely to be able to satisfactorily respond to the international community's concerns. if the courts focus on being thorough, they will be
unable to address the concern for moving through the enormous volume of cases facing the courts and would pose particular dangers to
those who may be innocent but who are presently detained. Likewise,
if the courts focus on speed, they would generate fundamental due
process conCerns for most of thuse accused. Indeed, any justice system
with such a backlog of cases would find the task of providing speedy
but thorough justice Herculean.!" This situation presents a strong case
for an alternative means of finding justice. Rwanda's chosen alternative
is the gacaca process, the innovative third arm of the tripartite legal
response to genocide.

- -...........

-

143. See Rwandan Genocide Law, supra note 65.
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visited Aug. 2,2002).
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Asylum in Ihe Uniled Siaies (May 13, 2002), available al http://www.lchr.org/

117

Accountability in the Aftermath of Rwanda's Genocide

E.

GACACA

Faced with an overwhelming judicial caseload and a large number
of suspects in prison awaiting trials that may never come Rwanda
recently implemented a system of community-based justice called gacaca.
Gacaca is modeled after a traditional community conflict-resolution mechanism with the same name, ,vhich loosely translates from Kinyanvanda
as "justice on the grass."146 Traditionally, gacaea was used to settle land
disputes. In post-genocide Rwanda, the new version of gacaca will be
used to try individuals charged with crimes in Categories Two, Three
and Four, with some level of court supervision. Category One offenses
will remain in the national courts.1 47
f

The gacaea process meets two urgent needs not met by either the
ICTR or the national judicial process: speed and inclusiveness. The need
for speed responds directly to the lengthy detentions of suspected genoeidaires and to the overcrowded jail conditions. The need for inclusiveness responds to the ineffectiveness of both the ICTR and the national
genocide trials in engaging individuals and communities in the work of
reconciliation. Although gacaca is still in its early stages, it promises to
complement the existing international and national accountability mechanisms responding to the genOCide.

1.

Background and Goals

Rwanda has two principal goals for the gaeaca process.!48 First, the
government hopes gacaea will speed case resolution, lowering the economic impact of the trials on the country's limited finances and minimizing criticism by the international human rights groups who oppose
its past and current treatment of prisoners.1 49 Second, and more important, the government of Rwanda hopes gacaea will help attain reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi and between victims and genocidaires, in
a way that the ICTR and the national judicial system have thus far failed
to do. l50 As noted above, the Rwandan government was frustrated by
f

refugees/torchlight/newsletter /newslet_si1.htm. As in Rwanda, the needs for
speed and for thoroughness compete directly with each other.
146. Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12
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147. See RWA~DAN GOVERNME.:-.JT, supra note 91.
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the decision to locate the TCTR in Arusha, where its lessons about accountability would be removed from the people of Rwanda. Likewise, the pace
of the trials in the national judicial system and the terrible ongoing situation with the overcrowded prisons have done little to instill popular
trust in ao:ountability mechanisms. By contrast, the gacaca trials will take
place in and involve the communities where atrocities were committed,
and the trials will be held in front of those most directly affected-the
victims, the families of victims, and the communities for whom reconciliation is not an abstract goal but a constant daily struggle.
Despite the prominent language about reconciliation in Rwandan
references to gaeaea, the new system also purposefully retains a retributive element. The community ownership of the process is geared
toward reconciliation along the model of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). But unlike the TRC defendants who
come before the gacaca may receive prison sentences even when they
confess. The system was explicitly chosen over a wide-spread amnesty
system or investigative body because Rwanda did not want to relinquish its emphasis on individual accountabilitylSI
The Rwandan government's embrace of the gacaca also asserts the
primacy of its own traditions over those imposed by the international
community in the early days following the genOCide. Unhappy with the
performance of the ICTR, the government hopes that this innately
Rwandan process will join all Rwandans in the work of rebuilding the
culture of law in Rwanda.

2. The Gacaca Process
Rwanda passed its law governing the gacaca process in January
2001.''' Rwandans elected 200,000 gacaea judges in October 2001 and
began training these judges in April 2002, eight years after the genocide began lS3 The judges must be "persons of integrity," but they are
not required to have any prior legal training or experience. Cacnea
judges take responsibility for the fairness and orderliness of proceed151. Peter t;vin, The Introduction of a lvfodemized Gacaca for Judgirlg Suspects
of Participtltion iu the Genocide and Ihe ,\1assacrcs oj 1994 in RI.t:anda: A Discussion
Paper Prepared for the Belgian Secretary of State far Dewlopmenl Coopemtio,' (2001),
available at http;/lw\\'\.\f.macconsortium.org!ITV/2oo1 /Uvin.gacaca .report.htm.
152. See Organic Law on GaeDea, Organic Law No. 40/2000 (2001) [hereinafter GACACA LAwj,

153. See Hirondelle Foundation, Training of Gaeaea ludges Sfarts 8 April 2002,
available 01 http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle/nsf/ (Apr. 3, 2002) (last visited May 22, 2002).
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ings. Caeaea's Assembly, which consists of all inhabitants of the community over 18 years of age, holds the task of identifying which crimes
will be prosecuted and who will be accused of those crimes. The duties
of the General Assembly also include creating lists of those who died,
those who were raped, and those who moved away, and gathering evidence which incriminates or exonerates those who have been accused
of participating in the genocide l54 At the higher levels of gaeaca, the
General Assemblies consist of elected representatives from these local
assemblies. ISS

Gacaca courts are organized on levels that reflect the Rwandan administrative structure, with authority and jurisdiction allocated over four
increasingly large territorial areas: cell, sector, district and province.
Cacaea courts at the most local level, the celt will try only prisoners and
suspects accused of Category Four crimes {property damage and vandalism)IS6 Sector-level courts will try Category Three offenses, while
district-level courts will try Category Two offenses and appeals from
Category Three cases. The province-level courts will handle appeals
from district-level decisions. Those accused of Category One offenses
cannot use the gacaca process; these most serious cases remain in the
national judicial system.
Caeaea trials look very different from those taking place in the lCTR
and the national judicial system.!S7 In a gacaca trial, the defendant has no
lawyer and faces a judge who is also the prosecutor. The trial takes place
in the community where the crime allegedly took place, in front of a
crowd that would normally include the victim and/or the victim's family and friends. When the judge reads the charges against the defendant,
the defendant is allowed to respond with his or her version of the events
in question, and may call upon witnesses from the assembled community to verify his or her story. If no one in the community has any evidence against the defendant, then the defendant is freed. The defendant
may also enter a guilty plea to reduce his or her sentence. As in the
national judicial system, this introduction of the guilty plea has provoked
controversy. Given the number of years some of these defendants have
already been in jail awaiting trial. the reduced sentence they receive by
pleading guilty means that many of them will be freed immediately.
The gacaea process began on a pilot basis in May 2001, with seven
trials of suspects who had been detained in prison for more than four

154.
155.
156.
157.

See RWAl\DAN GOVERl\MENT, supra note 9l.
ld.
See GACACA LAW, supra note 152.
See generally, Nantulya, supra note 148; Uvin, supra note 151.
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years)" In the case of one IS-year-old, the judge read the charges and
asked the community for their evidence. After the judge's request was
met three times with silence, the defendant was freed. Another defendant was accused of participating in the killing, and several women
spoke up against her after the charges were read. The judge warned
them that they needed to be able to produce evidence, and that false testimony was a serious offense. The defendant was taken back to jail, and
her case will be handled in a later (non-pilot) gacaca session.159 In all,
four people were released that day, and the other cases were postponed
until the official process began in 2002.
By the time all courts are operational, there will be n,ooo gacaca
courts throughout Rwanda, involving more than 250,000 judges.!bO In
the meantime, 73 garaca courts in 11 provinces have begun their duties.!'!
The first task for the gacaca courts is developing the list of genocide victims and suspected perpetrators; this list will be the basis for the actual
trials scheduled to commence in late 2002. As of August 2002, the process
remains popular with genocide survivors, and with prisoners and their
families.'62 Some troubles have arisen as to whether crimes committed
by the Rwandan Patriotic Front should also be brought before the gacaca
courts; this issue has not been resolved as of October 2002.'63
It would be a mistake to think of gacaca as an entirely traditional
legal mechanism. Although the process has its roots in the older community-based conflict resolution mechanism whose name it has adopted,
the post-genocide gacaca has been initiated and will be administered by
the state, and will use the coercive power of the state to imprison both
those who are found guilty of genocide-related crimes and those who
are found guilty of offering false evidence against the defendants.
Moreover, unlike the traditional gacaca which was contained within individual communities; the modern variant moves into larger and larger
administrative units as defendants lodge appeals and as the seriousness
of the charges increases. 1M

158. See Mary Kimani, Cormnrmity Frees Four Genocide Suspects During Pilot
Gacaca Justice Process, Internews Network Reporting from the [eTR (2001), available at http://www.intemews.org I activities I ICTR_reporIs/ICTR_"'ports_may200l.
him.
159. See id.
160. See Herve Bar, Watchdog Criticises Rwanda's Village Courts, AGE:-.!CF.
FRANCE PRESSE (Aug. 23, 2002).
161. Hirondelle Foundation, Le Lent Decol/age des Gameo (Oct. 1,2002), ami/able at http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondeUe.nsfl.
162. See Bar, ;;;upra note 160,
163. HiTOndelle Foundati()n, supra note 16l.
164. See generally Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: Eledwl!s May Speed Genocide
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3. Hopes and Concerns
The Rwandan government and people have enormous hopes for the

gacaea process, seeing it as the practical and philosophical answer to
what has been missing in the lCTR and national judicial trials. The practical hope is that gacaea trials will expedite the judicial process. The
greater philosophical hope is that by engaging Rwandans in the act of
holding individuals accountable for spedfk ads of genocide, the trials
will instill an expectation of accountability and will contribute to breaking down the culture of impunity in Rwanda.
In the gamea model, participation is seen not just as a means to an
end, but as an end in itself,l6S The hopes embedded in the international
community's embrace of participation are equally embedded in gawca:
participation as empowering and sustainable, participation as the route
to building peace, participation as the key to societal transformation.
This transformation is possible in thr('e ways, First, the community'S
participation is hoped to have a cathartic element for the victim or victim's family whose suffering will be publicly acknowledged, Second,
participation should lead to greater social acceptance of the results of
the trials and facilitate the reintegration of those found innocent, or those
who have already served their time while in detention, Third, participation acknowledges that what happened in 1994 happened in and to
communities, and allows Rwandans to experience a different sort of
community mobilization that is geared at rebuilding, not destruction,
Although many in the internalional community share the Rwandan
government's hopes for gacaca, human rights groups are approaching
the gacaca process with strong reservations. The most serious concern is
about the lack of traditional due process; some see gacaca as a form of
mob justice, incapable of protecting defendants' rights to a fair triaL The
opposite resuIt may also occur-some criminal suspects may be freed
at hearings where witnesses are afraid to publicly identify themselves
and present evidence. In either case, the Western understanding of "due
process of law" is largely absent from these proceedings in several
Trials (Oct, 4, 2001), available al http://www.hrw,org/press/2001/IO/rwandalO04,
htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2002) [hereinalrer ELECTIONS MAY SPEED GENOCIDE
TRIALS],

165. The model's emphasis on partidpation puts it in perfect step with the
preeminent intefTh'ltional development approach of the 19905, whkh emphasizes
the virtue of participation. The methodology is not new (first and best articulated by Paolo Freire in the 19705), but it became mainstream wisdom from the
World Bank to the tiniest NG05 in the 19905. See, e,g., WORLD SA'" PARTICIPA·
TION SoURCEBOOK (1996), available at htlp://www,worldbank.org/wbi/source-

book/5bhome,htm,
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respects. First, defendants have no right to counsel, and the state's
resources go to investigations and prosecutions, but not to defense.
Second, judges playa prosecutorial role in addition to their convicting
and sentencing role. Third, the system relies largely upon the willingness of community members to speak out and trusts that social pressure
will encourage honesty. Social pressure, however, may work against the
desired honesty, and defendants may find themselves at the mercy of
fearful \vitnesses, unwilling to speak out in their defense.
The most reasonable approaches to gacaca balance these hopes and
concerns. Genocide survivors' group IBUKA notes that survivors may
be traumatized by reviving painful memories, but that the nation has
no choice given the "deluge" of cases facing the Rwandan government. 1M
Others weigh the speedy resolution of trials against the lack of traditional due process; as articulated by Alison DesForges of Human Rights
Watch, "[tlhe system has flaws, but it provides the only real hope for
trials in the foreseeable future for more than 100,000 persons now
detained in inhumane conditions."H>7 In desperate need of a way to move
quickly bu t in a spirit of justice, the Rwandan government has developed what seems likely to be a sturdy mechanism to empower thousands of communities to move forward together in their reconstruction
of society under the law.

F.

COMPLEMENTARITY AMONG THE SYSTEMS OF
ACCOUNTABILITY

The experimce of Rwanda's efforts to create accountability for genocide provides a valuable model of complementarity among distinct
accountability mechanisms. The model's complicated structure is without precedent in international law, and is all the more impressive for
having developed organically; as one mechanism's inadequacies showed,
another mechanism was developed to compensate for those weaknesses.
This architecture for accountability experienced its share of growing
pains and still has room for improvement, but the functioning of these
three mechanisms offers Rwanda an opportunity to achieve its goals of
justice, deterrence and reconciliation, as well its broader goal of eliminating the culture of impunity.

166, Helen Vesperini, Rwanda i-o Start Genocide Tnals at Village Courts, EASTERN AFruCA TIMES (ONU!':E Eomo;J) (July 25, 2002), "vailable at http://www.easternabcatimes.com/news/2002/june/rwal006.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2002).
167. See ELECT]OKS MAY SPEED GENOCiDE TRL<\L5, supra note 164.
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The lessons emerging from the response to genocide in Rwanda are
instructive not just for the pursuit of justice within Rwanda, but for the
international community more broadly and for any future efforts to build
structures of accountability in similarly challenging contexts. 1\;0 single
prescription from the U,N. and other international bodies can fix every
country's ailments, but the Rwandan experience does provide" general
template for action, urging international and national actors to learn to
work together in mutually reinfordng ways, Having addressed the relative effectiveness of each mechanism earHer in the chapter,. we now
look not at whether the mechanisms are as good as they could be, but
rather at whether the over arching goal of accountability for genocide in
Rwanda could be achieved adequately without all three instruments
working together. We will describe the ways in which the three mechanisms complement each other, examine the sometimes diificult lessons
from the Rwandan experience, and consider what that entire experience
may mean for the future operation of the International Criminal Court.
1. The Vision of Complementarity

An exceptionally complex event like the Rwandan genocide calls
for exceptional legal responses, As this chapter attempts to show, no one
legal body is equipped to respond on the necessary scale, and no one
legal body's mandate is flexible and diverse enough to accommodate
the often-competing goals for accountability in the aftermath of massive crimes against humanity. The concept of complementarity recognizes such compleXities and offers a way through them: by allowing
multiple mechanisms to respond to events like the Rwandan genocide,
the legal response becomes greater and more effective than the sum of
its parts.
H would be helpful to first clarify what complementarity is not.
Complementarity is not simply about dividing up the judicial workload,
[n the early vision of the ICTR's role, for example, commentators seemed
to confine its role to being little more than an extra pair of hands in the
task of holding perpetrators of the genocide accountable, Indeed, the
Rwandan government occasionally subscribes to this perspective and
bemoans the resources that are "wasted" on the ICTR. Nor should a
mechanism like gacaca be lmderstood as primarily being about reducing the backlog of cases, although this will be a significant benefit of the
process, Such views are short-sighted. Complementarity's effectiveness
should not be measured in simp Ie terms of the numbers of cases tried
or the numbers of individuals released from prison, Rather, complementarity must be understood in terms of its ability to advance the over-
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all goals of accountability, and in te rms of the role that each mechanism
plays in achieving those goals,
If complementarity relates to each mechanism's role in achieving an
overall goal-here, accountability-then the international community
and Rwanda have clearly forged complementary relationships despite
some grinding tensions along the way, and despite ongoing room for
improvements in the various mechanisms. The ICTR clearly plays a role
that no other body at the time could have played, notwithstanding its
tense relationship with the Rwandan government. First, the creation of
the JCTR holds the international community accountable for what it
failed to do in 1994. The genocide indicted the international community's failure to intervene, and the creation of the lCTR by the Security
Council was a belated but appropriate recognition that the international
community had some responsibility for what happened in Rwanda in
1994. Only a visible institution with an international mandate could
effectively acknowledge this responsibility; international support for
Rwandan efforts would have been less visible and probably less durable,
since funding could have been cut without the world paying much attention, Second, the [CTR's creation permitted the world to acknowledge
the events of 1994 and to keep an accurate record of the genOcide. The
ICTR has created an impressive official body of detailed information
that will brook no denial of the horrors of the genOCide. This truth-gathering function of the leTR will aid in the quest for reconciliation, much
as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa was designed
to do. Third, on a practical level, the ICTR was able to compel the extradition of suspected genocidaires, something that Rwanda has had difficulty doing c'n its own.
The national genocide trials in Rwanda likewise meet unique needs
in the quest for accountability for genocide. First, these trials permit
Rwanda to show the world and its own people that the post-genocide
government intends to dismantle the culture of impunity in Rwanda.
Three decades of impunity for violence against Tutsis ended in 1996
when the genocide trials began. Adhering as well as possible to international standards for fair trials, the courts have already brought thousands of suspects to justice. The courts have therefore played an
instructive role, showing Rwandans how to achieve justice through the
rule of law, Second, the Rwandan judicial system's tremendous increase
in capacity serves another critical goal, namely sustainability. The lCTR
is not permanent, and when it finishes, the Rwandan judicial system
will need to keep working, not just on genocide crimes but on the full
range of crimes awaiting prosecution in Rwanda. IncreaSing the durability and sturdiness of the Rwandan judicial system is the only way to
maintain accountability over the long term.
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Finally, the Rwandan genocide trials serve the goal of deterrence in
a way that the [CTR does not. The deterrent effect of the ICTR, such as
it is, seems directed at the international community writ large, not at
Rwandans in particular. The limited temporal mandate of the ICTR
means that Rwandans know that nothing they do in the future will be
the subject of an ICTR investigation or indictment. Because the ICTR
will not exist permanently, and because the ICTR's mandate is limited,
it can only hope to deter genocide in a general way: by creating fear that
the international community would establish a similar body to deal with
future crimes. By contrast, the Rwandan system is more permanent. The
short-term goal of the genocide trials in Rwanda may be individual
accountability for the perpetrators of genocide, but the longer term goal
is the creation of a system that Rwandans of all ethnicities believe will
prosecute such crimes in the future, should they occur, and which therefore exerts an important deterrent pressure on would~be genocidaires,

Gacaca, too, plays a unique role in the Rwandan architecture for
accountability. Gocaca is the only mechanism explicitly designed to
achieve one of the principle objectives of the Rwandan government: reconciliation. With their emphasis on individual accountability, neither
the ICTR nor the Rwandan national judicial system could play this role
directly. Because gamea occurs in and is governed by the communities
that suffered during the genOcide, gamea allows Rwandans to participate in the new model of accountability and the new efforts to break
down the culture of impunity.
Beyond its unique role, gamea is likely to complement the lCTR and
the national genOCide trials in three ways. First, gamra complements the
deterrent role played by the national genocide trials. Fear that one may
be judged by one's neighbors, and knowledge that such a judgment
could carry a prison sentence, should act as at least a minor deterrent
to those who might consider partaking in any renewed violence. Second,
gacaca has a truth-telling aspect that complements the records being created at the national and international levels. Although the gacaca courts
will not keep the same kinds of formal records that the Rwandan judiciary and the ICTR keep, the effect of speaking the truth in front of a
large community cannot be underestimated in a country where oral tradition and oral history is so important.1 68 Third, the thousands of gacaca
trials that are currently underway in Rwanda will create a wealth of
information that will be useful to the national genocide trials and the
168. Andrew Harding. Rwanda's Slow Ju,tice, BBC NEWS (May 19,2001) (noting the influence of oral trad ition on other parts of the legal resporu.e to genocide, specifically the lCrR), available al http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
programmes / from_ our_Q\'Vn __ ('orrespondent / 1338263.stm,
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lCTR trials. One human rights organization has already directed US.
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Pierre-Richard Prosper, to
the gacaca trials in one commune for evidence that might convince the
United States to find and extradite a suspected gcnacidaire.:6'
Beyond the role that each mechanism plays in furthering the m'erall goals of accountability in the aftermath of the Rwandan genOcide,
the complementarity of mechanisms seems like an appropriate symbol
of the gruesome fact that local, national and international actors all need
to atone for actions taken and not taken in 1994. Any legal response that
existed on only one or two of these levels would be unable to fully meet
the demands of accountability.

2. The Particular Challenges Posed by Concurrent Jurisdiction
Despite ongoing setbacks and ,,;maining hurdles, the three mechanisms chosen to pursue accountability and justice in Rwanda have functioned together remarkably well, given the challenges of delivering
justice on three levels simultaneously. However, two key challenges
remain. both related to the concurrent jurisdiction shared by the ICTR
and the Rwandan naticmal judiciary.
The first challenge relates to the sometimes-competing principles of
concurrent jurisdiction and national sovereignty. 'Ine ICTR's primacy over
the Rwandan judiciary has led to some of the worst tension in the relationship between these bodies. Fundamental to international law is the
principle that "a nation-state has jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed within its territory and by its own nationals."I?O [n the Rwandan
case, the ICTR can prosecute such crimes, regardless of whether or not
the Rwandan govemment is able and willing to prosecute the crimes itself.
The ICTR's primacy has created resentment in Rwanda over Rwanda's
inability to prosecute some of the most serious cases of genocide and has
diminished the educational and deterrent effects sought by the L:nited
Nations Security Council when establishing the ICTRl71 This disernpowering aspect of ICTR thus frustrates and diminishes the work the
Rwandan government is doing to break down the culture of impunity.
169, Rakiya Omdar, Cornmtmicatiorr to Ambassad(Jr~tlt~Larsc for War Crimes
issues, AFRiCA NEWS SfRV. (July 25, 2002).
170. Evo Popoff; lnconsi,<jterrcy arid Impunity in International Human Rights
Law: Can the Infernational Criminal Court Solve the Problems Raised by the Rwanda
and Augusto Pinochet Cases, 33 GEO. WASH. I>in L. REV. 363, 371 (2001).
171. See Stanley Foundation, Post-Cof~llicf Justice: The Role oj the International
Community (Apr. 1997): available at http://reports.stanleyfoundation.org/
Vantage97.pdf (last visited Sept. 5,2002),
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Despite the Rwandan government's substantial efforts to reconstruct the
national judiciary and make it function according to international standards of due process,'" the ICTR's ability to exercise jurisdiction over certain cases implies that the international community believes that Rwanda's
commitment to justice and capacity to provide it are not now, and never
will be, quite good enough.
The concurrent jurisdiction problem also relates to a second challenge, which is the disparity in sentencing possibilities. Those accused
of the worst crimes are usually tried by the ICTR, which does not permit the death penalty, while many of those accused of lesser crimes face
the death penalty in Rwanda; such inequities frustrate the Rwandans
and alarm international human rights groups. Notwithstanding the
increasing conviction among members of the international community
that the death penalty is a violation of human rights. no legal consensus under international law expressly forbids the death penaltyY' The
decision not to impose the death penalty in ICTR trials is "essentially a
question of determining whether, because of moral considerations, conceptions of justice prevailing in certain sodeties should prevail over that
of the Rwandese people."171 [n this contest between competing conceptions of justice, the Rwandan conception did not carry the day, which
compounds the disempowering aspects of the ICTR Anytime that choices
are being rnade about concurrent jurisdiction, the benefits must be
weighed against these real costs to both national sovereignty and the
empowerment of national judicial systems.
3. lessons for the Future and for the ICC
The Rwandan experience with three different accountability mechanisms provides a rich source of lessons for future efforts to provide
accountability in the aftermath of crimes against humanity. Many have
noted that Rwanda's long tradition of lack of accountability helped
lead to the 1994 genocide. This tradition can best be remedied through
cooperation between the international community and the Rwandan
government.
172. The extent to which Rwanda is successfully adhering to due process
standards is debated, Compare STATE DEPARTMENT 2001 HCMAN RIGHTS REPORT.
supra note 113, witlt TROUBLED COURSE OF JUS11CE, Sl'pra note 75.
173. Payam Akhavan, Current De-oe1opmenfs,' Tile Interw1fiona! Crimit1111
TribunalIor Rwandfl, the Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment,. 90 Al\1, J, INT'L L
501, 508 (1996). Buf see Council of Europe: Protocol 10 the COllvention ~ftjr the
Protection of HuttlfJn RigltfS and Fundamental F'"ecdoms Concerning the Abolition of
the Deatl, Penalty, 22 I.L.!\-\' 538 (1985).
174. See Akhavan, supra note 173, at 508.
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The new International Criminal Court (ICC) will substantially alter
the way the international community handles genocide and wide-spread
crimes against humanity, such as occurred in Rwanda. The ICC will
create an entirely new set of issues regarding international-national
relationships over the prosecution of genocide r war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. l,;nlike the jurisdictional rules of the Rwanda tribunal, the ICC's jurisdictional mandate took effect before the crimes it will
prosecute occur. 173 Thus, the debates over temporal juri sdiction, so contentious in Rwanda, will not be an issue. The ICC will also have jurisdiction over individuals around the world, in contrast to the ICTR's
jurisdiction only over individuals who committed crimes in Rwanda,
or Rwandans who committed crimes in neighboring states. Nevertheless,
the Rwandan experience offers important lessons for the new world of
international accountability, in which the ICC is bound to playa pivotal role.

d.

Each Level Needs to See Itself as Being Part of a Whole

Each accountability mechanism may have some subset of goals that
are unique to itself, but one lesson from Rwanda is that the actors in
these separate mechanisms must remember that they all share the same
ultimate goal: accountability for the genocide. Where those involved in
each mechanism remember this, as in the relationship between the
national genocide trials and the gacaca trials, complementarity is at its
best. Where they forget this, as in the relationship between the Rwandan
government and the ICTR, complementarity is weaker.
The Rwandan government initiated both the national genocide trials and the gacaca process as two mechanisms working together toward
the same goal. Both mechanisms have an overarching goal of accountability and justice; gacaca emphasizes accountability and reconciliation.
Nevertheless, these efforts are viewed as mutually reinforcing, so it is
perhaps unsurprising that little tension has arisen between the two mechanisms thus far. Indeed, the complementarity between these two bodies' roles is striking. Together, they build the legal capacity of institutions
(national genocide trials) and individuals (gacaca), engaging both in the
project of rebuilding and reconciliation. The jurisdictional boundaries
175. ICC jurisdiction took effect on July 1, 2002. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc A/Conf. 183/9, July 17, 1998, available
at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm; U.N. Diplomatic Conference
Concludes in Rome with Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc. L/2889 (July 20,1998).
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of each are clear, and there have been no reports of tension about which
cases get tried in which forum.
By contrast, both the international community and the Rwandan
government often perceive the national genocide trials and the ICTR trials as being in direct competition. By focusing on resources and speed
of trials, the Rwandan government ignores the real contributions that
ICTR can make and has made toward its specific goals and toward the
goal shared by all three mechanisms: accountability for genocide.
Likewise, the international community's criticisms of the Rwandan
national genocide trials ignore the distinct hope that the Rwandan government has for using the trials to teach Rwandans about justice and for
eliminating the culture of impunity. Each side must view the other as a
necessary part of achieving full and lasting accountability, and filter criticisms through that lens.
The frequent lack of understanding between the Rwandan government and the [CTR points toward Ihe need for education and exchange
between all levels involved in the process of creating accountability. The
disagreement over the death penalty is but one example of a disagreement where the U.N. and human rights groups could have better
explained their justification for opposing the death penalty for the crimes
of genOcide that occurred in Rwanda, and could have worked to increase
judicial and legal competency in national courts where the death penalty
was to be applied. Another source of tension-the plea bargain-could
pOSSibly have been circumvented had the ICTR presented the concept,
not as afait accompli, but as a subject for national dialogue and debate
in Rwanda; when such innovations are imposed without discussion,
they may initially undermine the efforts to achieve local legitimacy.
b. The International Community and the National Government
Must Take the long View in Their Response to Genocide and
Crimes Against Humanity
The theme of breaking down the culture of impunity emerged early
in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, and helped provide a longterm vision for the legal response to genocide. This long-term vision is
both appropriate and necessary. It is appropriate because the genocide
was not caused by the assassination of President Habyarimana but
instead had rools that stretched back through de<:ades of Rwandan history. It is necessary because a legal response that took only a shari-term
view would have done little to prevent such crimes from recurring in
the future.
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The rCTR's lack of focus on the long term is its greatest weakness;
the ICC's focus on the long term is its greatest hope. The ICTR's temporal jurisdiction takes a narrow view of the timeframe for the genocide, and its lack of permanence makes it unlikely that it would be in
existence to prosecute such crimes in the future. By comparison, the
ICC's jurisdiction became effective in July 2002, and if such atrocities
were to recur in the future, the ICC would be able to prosecute crimes
committed during the planning stages as efiectively as the execution of
the atrocities themselves. Moreover, the ICC's permanence is bound to
help it playa greater deterrent role than the ICTR ever could, since
would-be genocidal res know that they could be called before the tribunal regardless of who holds power domestically. The very existence of
the ICC therefore helps break down the culture of impunity by holding
out the possibility of justice for all.
c. Internafiona! I\ssistance Musl Focus Not Just on !nternational

Bodies, but also on Strengthening Domestic Systems
The Rwandan experience clearly shows that a purely international
response (X)uld not meet all the goals of accountability in the aftermath
of genocide and crimes against humanity. The ICTR has been successful with individual-level accountability, but has been unsuccessful at
promoting reconciliation and at helping Rwanda rebuild a culture based
on the rule of law. The best equipped, best staffed, best funded international tribunal in the world would still have some disempowering
effect on local efforts to achieve justice and would still do little to promote reconciliation. The Rwandan experience emphasizes that national
institutions must be strengthened before nations can grapple seriously
with accountability.
The international role in strengthening domestic systems cannot be
overstated: from direct funding for public defenders to high-level training of judges, from the physical restoration of courts to the provision of
law books, international aid for national judiciaries would be money
well spent. The expense associated with making judicial projects a priority should be assessed not in com-parison to other in-country priorities like health or education, but in comparison to the peacekeeping
expenses associated with preventing crimes against humanity and restoring order once those crimes have occurred; any foreign aid that helps
break down a country's culture of impunity must be considered costeffective in this longer term view.
The international community must also be willing to support innovations like gacaca. If for no other reason, interested donors can help to
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ensure that such mechanisms are fair. More fundamentally. support for
locally developed processes acknowledges that exclusive reliance on
courtroom-style judicial proceedings is probably inadequate, and may
perversely exacerbate local tensions and alienate the individuals the
international community is hoping to protect. Gacaca has met with a
great deal of skepticism internationally, but it is seen domestically as a
hope and a possible salvation; support despite misgivings would be a
humble but appropriate measure for an international community that
clearly has not always acted in Rwanda's best interests.
d. rhe Architecture for Accountilbilily f'v1ust Be Innovative and'
Flexible

The Rwandan experience shows the limits of formal court tribunals,
and points toward the need for innovation and flexibility as part of a
comprehensive response to crimes against humanity, The gacaca process
is perhaps the most interesting element of the legal response to the
Rwandan genocide. The gacaca process is an innm'ation highly appropriate for the local culture, since its roots lie in the Rwandan tradition
of community-based justice. Cacaca is also highly appropriate for the
goal of making accountability the project of eyery Rwandan affected by
genocide-its emphasis on participation ensures that the lessons of breaking down the culture of impunity will be learned in all the communities where the genocide took place.
We do not argue that a gawca-style process is called for in every situation where genocide or crimes against humanity occur/ or that gacaca
is a faultless process that will in itself solve the problem of the Rwandan
culture of impunity. Rather we argue that accountability is ultimately
best served by the indusion of an innovative locally designed process
in the legal response to genocide. What the Rwandan government did
in the aftermath of genocide was to deiine its goals. and look to see how
those goals were and were not being met by existing mechanisms, The
gacaca process emerged from the recognition that the existing mechanisms could deliver justice neither swiftly enough nor inclUSively enough.
It is this willingness to be flexible in trying different approaches, and to
use innovation to make the legal response whole that is a powerfullesson from the Rwandan experience.
Thls lesson will become increasingly important as the ICC firmly
establishes itself. With permanent staff, time-tested procedures and an
ever-growing body of case law, the ICC in a few years may induce a
kind of inertia that would make national-level innovation less appealing, especially in resource-poor countries, and possibly more difficult.
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If countries that lack resources start to use the ICC trials as a substitute
for domestic processes, then accountability will suffer for, as we have
seen, the extent to which such trials can achieve accountability is sharply
circumscribed by mandate, process and distance. There will almost
always be a useful role for some kind of locally developed forum to participate in the work of accountability, and reliance on the ICC must not
blind countries to that reality.

e. International Accountability Mechanisms Must Respect
Domestic Views of Justice

One important and positive difference between the ICC and the ICTR
is that. although there is concurrent jurisdiction between the ICC and the
country which otherwise has jurisdiction, the ICC will not have the same
primacy over national courts. If a trial is being prosecuted fairly and
effectively in the national court, then that court maintains jurisdiction.
The ICC steps in only where a state with jurisdiction over the rna Iter of
concern "is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation
or prosecution" or where a state decision not to prosecute "resulted from
the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute." ,'76
Therefore, tensions like those that existed in Rwanda over national sovereignty and the death penalty will be much less likely to arise.
Nonetheless, the ICC and the eN. will still need to walk a careful
line between aggressive international prosecutions and the protection
of local autonomy in judicial matters. Aggressive international prosecution could have the same disernpowering effects that have been
described above in terms of the ICTR's relationship to the Rwandan government. Especially where the failure to prosecute results from weak
capacity and not weak political will, the international community should
first consider ways to strengthen domestic systems instead of consistently opting for international prosecution. Another reason to favor
national prosecutions is the problem posed by conducting justice at a
distance. The disconnect that average Rwandans feel toward the proceedings in Arusha bodes poorly for the extent to which the ICC will be
a useful tool for reconciliation. Although it may be extremely effective
for individual-level accountability, the people who were harmed by the
genocide or by crimes against humanity are unlikely to feel as vested in
the results of a far-away tribunal as they are in the results of a tribunal
whose daily proceedings they can follow dosely. There will always be
a role for trials at both levels, and the international community will do
well to support local-level trials wherever pOSSible.
176. Id. at art. 17.
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G. CONCLUSION

The international community has played an active role in punishing those accused of genocide and other crimes against humanity on
several occasions during the 20th century. International actors should
continue to focus on these mallers in the 21st century, but they should
also build upon promising i1movations that go beyond traditional courtcentered means of accountability, and search for numerous, complementary ways to heal nations torn apart by violence. In time, an
international strategy that goes beyond the creation of international
criminal tribunals and that works with, rather than above, local governments will be more effective in redressing wrongs and preventing
future atrocities. With careful attention to the lessons offered by the
Rwandan experience, the International Criminal Court can be an integral part of any such complementary response to genocide and crimes
against humanity in the future.
While the international community absorbs the lessons from Rwanda's
experience, it must not forget that this is a living process, a process with
rOom for improvement and with need for continued international support. The three legal mechanisms responding to the genocide in Rwanda
should, at a minimum, be able to bring most of those guilty of genocide
in Rwanda to justice, but neither Rwanda nor the international community should lose sight of an even higher goal. The highest honor that
can be paid to those whose lives were destroyed in the genOCide will be
the rebuilding of Rwandan society along more inclusive lines, so that
the events of 1994 are not repeated. If law is to playa central role in this
larger task, the Rwandan government must allow its legal system to
Serve as a model of accountability for all and to become an institution
in which all Rwandans, of any ethnic or political background, can place
their trust. aniy then will the culture of impunity be truly dismantled
and the cycle of fear, exclusion and repression be truly halted. The international community must continue to support Rwanda as it makes this
difficult bUI essential journey.

